Does Turkey Have Nuclear Weapons? A Look at Their Nuclear Power and Security Situation

Generation mix: natural gas 108 TWh (33%); coal 104 TWh (31%); hydro 55. 7 TWh (17%); wind 31. 1 TWh (9%); solar 13. 3 TWh (4%); geothermal 10. 8 TWh (3%); biofuels & waste 6. 3 TWh; oil 0. 3 TWh.

Turkey imports much of its energy – about 75% in 2021. Improving energy efficiency and energy security are high priorities1. Russia provides about one-third of its gas2, and in February 2016, Gazprom arbitrarily raised gas prices by 10%. 25% regardless of contracts, and cut supply when Turkish firms declined to pay the extra.

The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (EKTB) base scenario predicts that by 20233, consumption will reach 376 TWh. One of the main components of the nation’s plans for economic expansion is the development of nuclear power, which attempts to reduce its precarious reliance on Russian gas for electricity. The state generation company is Elektrik Uretim AS (EUAS).

Plans are to have 30 GWe of coal-fired capacity by 2023, along with 4. 8 GWe of nuclear capacity. However, much of the country’s coal resources are lignite with low calorific value – less than 12. 5 MJ/kg, as well as a significant quantity (Afsin Elbistan) with high sulfur content at less than 5 MJ/kg (one-quarter of typical steam coal).

The nation E2%80%99’s National Renewable Energy Action Plan, which is determined by the ETKB, aims to increase the proportion of renewable energy in the energy mix to 20% by 2020–2023 and decrease carbon emissions. It also adds 2061% of GWe to enable secure energy supply and reduce carbon emissions. This corresponds to an increase in the capacity of 34 GWe of hydropower, 20 GWe of wind, 5 GWe of solar, 1 GWe of geothermal, and 1 GWe of biomass. The plan will be assisted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).

Many nuclear power projects have been proposed: in 1970, a 300 MWe plant was the subject of a feasibility study; in 1973, the electricity authority decided to build an 80 MWe demonstration plant, but it never happened; in 1976, a nuclear plant license was granted for the Akkuyu site near the port of Mersin in the eastern Mediterranean; and in 1980, multiple plant construction attempts were unsuccessful due to a lack of government financial guarantee.

After a request for preliminary proposals in 1992, a nuclear plant was added to the nation’s investment program in 1993; however, the updated tender specifications were not made public until December 1996. AECL, Framatome Siemens, and Westinghouse Mitsubishi submitted bids for a 2000 MWe plant at Akkuyu. The government postponed making a decision eight times between June 1998 and April 2000, after the final bid deadline in October 1997, at which point plans were shelved because of financial difficulties.

The province of the Black Sea port city of Sinop was selected to house a commercial nuclear power plant at the beginning of 2006. This has the benefit of having cooling water temperatures that are roughly 5% lower than those at Akkuyu, allowing for roughly 1% more power output from any thermal unit. There was supposed to be a 100 MWe demonstration plant constructed first, followed by 5000 MWe of additional plants that would start operating in 2012. Some kind of public-private partnership was envisaged for construction and operation.

The government declared in August 2006 that it intended to have three nuclear power plants operating by 2012–15, totaling 4500 MWe. There had been discussions about an initial investment of two 750 MWe CANDU units with Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. These and the PWR type were apparently preferred. Since Akkuyu already had a license, the first units of the roughly 5000 MWe total would be built there; however, Sinop’s licensing was also in the process of being completed.

A new law pertaining to the construction, operation, and sale of nuclear power plants’ electricity was approved by the president in November 2007 after it was passed by parliament. The bill stipulated that the standards for developing and running the plants would be established by the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK). The Turkish Electricity Trade & Contract Corporation (TETAS) would then buy all the power under 15-year contracts. The bill also provided for public institutions to build the plants if other offers are not satisfactory. It also covered waste management and decommissioning, with provisions for generators to pay gradually into a Decommissioning Account (ICH) and a National Radioactive Waste Account (URAH) at 0 15 ¢/kWh. The OECD Paris and Brussels Conventions on third party accident liability would apply.

Regulations and Criteria for Investors who will Construct and Operate Nuclear Power Plants were published immediately after the passage of this law.

A nuclear cooperation agreement was signed with South Korea in June 2010, a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States entered into force in May 2008, and two such agreements with China were signed in April 2012.

Turkey underwent an integrated nuclear infrastructure review (INIR) by the IAEA in November 2013 to evaluate the nation’s readiness for the upcoming nuclear power program. It gave a positive report but suggested strengthening the regulatory body, creating a national plan for human resource development, and finishing up a national policy on nuclear energy.

It was revealed in November 2022 that the Turkish government had started looking into the possibility of building a third nuclear power plant.

Turkey received a preliminary proposal from Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) in January 2023 for the construction of four APR-1400 reactors at an undisclosed location in the nation’s north.

The Turkish government stated in September 2023 that talks with a Chinese company to build a multi-unit nuclear power plant in the eastern Thrace region are anticipated to be finished in the upcoming months.

The Trade of Electricity in Turkey Specifications were released by the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK), permitting PWR, BWR, or PHWR types with a minimum power output of 600 MWe and a minimum 40-year service life. Design certification in the nation of origin was accepted, which freed TAEK to focus on the 4800 MWe project’s site-specific elements. In the end, only one bid—from a total of 14 interested parties—was accepted for an AES-2006 power plant with four 1200 MWe reactors. This bid came from Atomstroyexport in cooperation with Inter RAO (both from Russia) and Park Teknik (Turkey). After some deliberation, TAEK found that it met technical criteria. (It was later revealed that TAEK demanded that foreign suppliers return used fuel, and that all but ASE were willing to comply.) ).

April 2009 was supposed to see a government decision based on TETAS’s commercial advice, but all that happened was a series of statements about how expensive power would be for the first fifteen years. Then in August 2009 two agreements between TAEK and Rosatom were signed with much fanfare. One dealt with nuclear cooperation, while the other was a standard agreement on information sharing about nuclear facilities and early notification of accidents involving nuclear power. These advanced the prospect of a Russian nuclear project at Akkuyu, most likely with the help of $225,000 in government equity to restrain the anticipated increase in electricity prices. The first reactor was expected to come online in 2016, and others in 2017, 2018 and 2019. Nevertheless, TETAS canceled the Atomstroyexport agreement and announced the launch of a new tender in response to a ruling by the nation’s highest legal authority. Instead, the parties proceeded to a direct high-level agreement.

The heads of state of Russia and Turkey inked an intergovernmental agreement in May 2010 for Rosatom to undertake the US$20 billion project of building, owning, and operating (BOO) the four 1200 MWe AES-2006 nuclear power units at Akkuyu. Through Atomstroyexport and Inter RAO UES, Rosatom will finance the project and begin with a 20100% equity stake in the Turkish Akkuyu project company, setting up to construct, own, operate, and decommission the plant. Longer-term, Rosatom entities intend to retain at least 51% of the company. It was anticipated that state-owned power company Elektrik Uretim AS (EUAS) and Turkish company Park Teknik would acquire sizeable stakes. In May 2013 Rosatom invited EdF to become an equity partner in the project, but EdF declined. Meanwhile, EUAS transferred the site to the project company.

Previously, the May agreement for 4800 MWe at Akkuyu was ratified by the parliament in July 2010 and by the Russian parliament in November. With 100% Russian ownership, the project company was registered as Akkuyu Nuclear JSC (Akkuyu Nukleer Santral/NGS Elektrik Uretim AS) in December 2011. In October 2013, Rusatom Overseas assumed the primary role in representing Russia in the project, serving as both manager and majority owner via JSC Rusatom Energy International. A consortium of three Turkish companies, Cengiz Holding, Kolin Construction, and JSC Kalyon Construction, each managed to hold the non-Russian strategic investor that was sought after. This was first picked up in mid-2017. 33%, subject to approval by the Turkish government and the energy regulator EPDK. By the end of 2017, it was anticipated that the financial terms and shareholder agreement would be completed. However, in February 2018, the Energy Ministry declared that the three companies had withdrawn from the project due to their inability to reach a commercial agreement with Rosatom.

Late in 2012 JSC Akkuyu NPP quoted the cost as $18. 7 billion, and the President of Russia declared in December that Russia would provide the project with full financing totaling more than $20 billion. Turkeys prime minister said that the equity capital of JSC Akkuyu NPP would be increased to $2. 4 billion, and the overall investment in the project would total $22 billion. Rusatom will supply the fuel.

TETAS will buy a fixed proportion of the power at a fixed price of 12. 35 ¢/kWh for 15 years. The percentage will be 2700 percent of the output from the first two units and 20300 percent of that from units 203. The remainder of the power will be sold by the project company on the open market. Following 2015 years, when the plant is anticipated to be paid off, the project company will give the Turkish government a portion of its profits, specifically 2020 percent. (These sovereign guarantees are not on offer for the Sinop plant. ).

By mid-2012 Rosatom said that the total cost could be $25 billion. In December 2011 the project company had filed applications for construction permits and a power generation licence. The business obtained a site license in the middle of 2012, and in February 2013, it awarded the first significant contract for site work. Another site licence was received in January 2014. In July 2014, an updated environmental impact assessment (EIS) was once again submitted, marking the fourth attempt, and it was authorized by the end of November. A report on site design parameters was then submitted to TAEK. In June 2015, the Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EPDK) approved a 36-month preliminary licence for the project, allowing for certain permits and preparatory work while the production licence was being obtained. The government declared in August 2016 that it would categorize the project as a strategic investment, thereby granting advantageous tax treatment.

TAEK approved design parameters for the site in February 2017. In June 2017, EPDK issued a power generation licence for the 4. 8 GWe plant for 49 years. After the project’s site and external event design (SEED) evaluation was finished in August, TAEK issued a limited construction permit for unit 1 in October 2017, enabling excavation and work on the plant’s non-nuclear components to begin. In April 2018, TAEK authorized the construction of unit 1, and on April 3rd, the construction was declared to have commenced. At the end of August 2019, unit 2’s construction license was approved, and work on the project started in April 2020. A construction licence for unit 3 was granted in November 2020, and construction commenced in March 2021. A construction licence was granted for unit 4 in October 2021, and construction commenced in July 2022. Atomstroyexport is general contractor for construction, though Turkish companies are expected to undertake 35-40% of the work. The reactors are based on the VVER-1200/V-392M design at Novovoronezh and designated as V-509.

In October 2020 it was reported that Inter Rao had decided to withdraw from the project.

When Russian contractor TSM Enerji took over for Turkish subcontractor IC Içtaş in July 2022, the construction process abruptly slowed down. Two months later, Presidents Erdogan of Turkey and Putin of Russia came to an agreement to start building again, with IC Içtaş regaining control of the agreement. The first unit of the plant is planned to start up in 2023.

In February 2023 a 7. 8 magnitude earthquake struck near Gaziantep, the biggest earthquake to hit the country in eight decades. The Akkuyu nuclear power plant is being constructed approximately 430 kilometers west of the earthquake’s epicentre, where aftershocks of roughly 3 0 magnitude were experienced. There were no reports of damage to the plant and following safety checks, construction continued.

In September 2022 the reactor pressure vessel for Akkuyu 2 was installed. In April 2023 the first core fuel load for Akkuyu 1 was delivered to the site.

Since February 2008, Sinop on the Black Sea coast has been the site of preparatory work for the construction of a second nuclear plant, as well as a €1 7 billion nuclear technology centre.

The proposal from a consortium headed by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) and Areva (now Framatome), with participation from Itochu and Engie, was approved by the government in May 2013. The consortium proposed four Atmea1 reactors with a combined capacity of roughly 4600 MWe. * These would be the first Atmea1 units built. They would have the same three steam generators—rather than four—as Framatome’s large EPR and be built with load following in mind. At the time cost was estimated at some $22 billion, though this has since doubled. After the proposal was approved, Japan and the United States reached an intergovernmental agreement for the “exclusive negotiating rights to build a nuclear power plant,” and in October 2013, the project’s official prime ministerial agreement was signed. This was ratified by parliament in March 2015 and provides for 70% loan financing, 30% equity.

EUAS intended to acquire a 33.5 percent stake in the project company, with Mitsubishi, Itochu, and Engie sharing the remaining balance. MHI said it planned to take 15%, and it expected the same for Itochu and 21% for Engie. EUAS then intended to take 49% equity. Engie, which operates seven nuclear reactors in Belgium, was to be the operator. Government sources described it as a build-operate-transfer (BOT) arrangement, whilst Engie described it as build-own-operate (BOO). In April 2018 Itochu withdrew from the project. Engie then pulled out also.

* Prior to this, Korea Electric Power Corporation (Kepco) and EUAS signed an agreement in March 2010 directing Kepco to prepare a bid to construct the plant at Sinop, with four APR-1400 reactors scheduled to begin operating in 2019. The bid, in conjunction with local construction group Enka Insaat ve Sanayi, was due in August. Kepco was to take 40% equity in the plant, and would help with financing. But this plan failed because Kepco insisted on getting government guarantees for electricity sales instead of TETAS, as they did at Akkuyu.

After expressing interest in talks to construct the 5600 MWe plant, Japan signed a document in December 2010 committing to prepare a bid, with a more formal agreement anticipated in March 2011. Toshiba and Tepco were involved with the proposal, using four 1350 MWe ABWR units. However talks were suspended at Japans request following the Fukushima accident, and Tepco has since opted out. According to later reports, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries may submit a bid utilizing APWR units and Kansai, which runs 11 PWRs. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared in March 2012 that negotiations on a nuclear cooperation agreement with Japan were still ongoing.

An agreement was signed in April 2012 between the EUAS and Canada’s Candu Energy to conduct a six-month study on the construction of a 3000 MWe plant at Sinop. In March 2013 the energy minister said that they had withdrawn from the process.

The initial deadline for completing a feasibility study was mid-2017, and the stated schedule called for construction to begin in 2017 and operations to begin in 2023. In May 2018 it was announced that the feasibility study was still several months from completion. The operational target date of 2023 has been dropped. In December 2018 it was reported that MHI and partners were negotiating to abandon the project. The energy minister announced in January 2020 that the government was reevaluating its partner selection because feasibility studies had not met his ministry’s standards for the construction budget and completion timeline. In September 2020 the Ministry of Environment and Urbanisation approved the final environmental impact assessment report for Sinop. Fugro finished a six-month project to characterize an offshore site in August 2021 in order to support more extensive feasibility studies for the project.

A proposal for the construction of four APR1400 reactors at an undisclosed location in the nation’s north was submitted by KEPCO in January 2023. This came after rumors circulated that KEPCO and the Turkish government had discussed developing four APR1400 reactors at Sinop in late 2022.

In March 2023 EUAS established a nuclear-focused subsidiary known as TUNAS, tasked with founding the Sinop project. TUNAS plans to commence excavations at the site in 2023.

There are plans to build further nuclear capacity at another site in the Thrace region of Turkey. October 2015 confirmed that TAEK had located Igneada in the Black Sea province of Kirklareli, 12 km from the Bulgarian border. Akcakoca between it and Sinop was also considered. Ankara, which has a minimal seismic risk, and Tekirdag, which is located on the Sea of Marmara’s northwest coast, have also been proposed locations. By the end of 2013, the energy ministry planned to announce the location of the third plant and issue an invitation for expressions of interest. This did not occur, and the prime minister stated in October 2014 that the project would primarily be carried out by indigenous people, with construction set to begin in 2019.

In order to initiate exclusive talks for the development and construction of a four-unit nuclear power plant in Turkey, EUAS, Westinghouse, and the State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation (SNPTC) of China signed an agreement in November 2014. No site was specified.

The country’s third nuclear power plant is almost definitely going to be built in the Thrace region, according to confirmation from Turkey’s Minister of Energy and Natural Resources in June 2018.

The Turkish government announced in November 2022 that it had started investigating the possibility of building a third nuclear power plant in East Thrace, which is in the northwest of the nation.

It was reported in June 2023 that talks were underway between Chinese companies and the Turkish government to build a nuclear power plant in the province of Kırklareli.

Turkey has modest uranium resources. In the early 1980s, the Department of Energy, Raw Material and Exploration (MTA) found the Temrezli deposit in the central Anatolian region, 220 km east of Ankara. MTA continued to explore the region for the next 10 years. Regional towns of Yozgat and Sorgun are nearby.

US-based Westwater Resources (formerly Uranium Resources Inc. , URI) was planning to develop the Temrezli ISL mine. Australian-based Anatolia Energy* had a 100% interest in 18 exploration licences which included the Temrezli project. Project activities were undertaken by A Dur Madencilik (Adur), a wholly-owned subsidiary. In June 2015 Westwater Resources took over Anatolia Energy. **.

* * * Anatolia Uranium Pty Ltd (AUL) owned 65% of the Temrezli project, with parent company Anatolia Energy holding the remaining 335 percent. AUL was an incorporated joint venture but ownership was rationalized in 2012-13. Zarga Resources, the parent company of Powertech Uranium, raised its ownership to a 2015 percentage stake in Anatolia Energy in February 2014.

** With uranium projects in Texas, Anatolia announced in June 2015 that it would merge with Colorado-based Westwater Resources (then URI). It was technically a takeover, so that the Turkish projects were then under URI (now Westwater Resources).

Based on NI 43-101 data, an initial economic evaluation of the Temrezli ISL uranium project was released in June 2013 and revised in May 2014. It found that costs would compare favourably with other (US) ISL projects. Resources at Temrezli are measured at 2351 tU, indicated at 2004 tU, and inferred at 732 tU at 0 117%U, 0. 092%U, and 0. 075%U respectively at the end of 2013. The Energy Ministry With initial capital cost of $41 million, 3800 tU could be recovered over 12 years at $16. 89/lb U3O8, giving project payback in less than one year. A development decision was anticipated, subject to funding, but in 2016 the project was shelved until after the market improved.

Preparing to relocate the Rosita treatment plant from Texas to Temrezli, Westwater Resources started a pre-feasibility optimization study of the Temrezli ISL project in 2015 and was making progress on permitting-related issues at the same time. Low uranium prices have delayed construction.

Significant uranium mineralization was found in the 1980s at the Westwater Resources Sefaatli uranium project, and an extensive drilling program on the Delier prospect is characterizing resources. Tulu Tepe is also prospective in that project area, 5 km southwest of Delier. A third prospect is Akcami, 2 km west of Tulu Tepe. The three cover 15 sq km. Sefaatli may be operated as a satellite of Temrezli (35 km away). The company also has a tenement holding in the West Sorgun area.

The Turkish government notified Westwater Resources in June 2018 that its mining and exploration licenses for the Temrezli and Sefaatli projects had been revoked. The projects were owned by the business’s Turkish subsidiary, Adur Madencilik Limited Sirketi, which made significant investments in them and had the sole right to explore and develop uranium in that country since 2007. In December 2018 Westwater filed a request for arbitration on the matter.

Although TAEK initially mandated that reactor vendors return spent fuel, as of May 2014, it was unclear whether used fuel for Akkuyu would stay in Turkey or be returned to Russia, as is customary for Russian plants located in non-weapons states.

Nuclear power plants operating in Turkey are required to make payments of $0. 15 per kWh of generated electricity into a fund for waste management.

Meeting energy needs is the responsibility of the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (MENR, also known as Enerji ve Tabii Kaynaklar Bakanlığı, ETKB).

The Nuclear Regulatory Authority’s (NDK) programs are set by the Nuclear Energy Commission (AEC), which also supervises all nuclear operations and submits budgets to the prime minister. An advisory council assists the AEC on matters referred to it. The NDK makes decisions regarding licenses after receiving advice from the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety.

Turkey Energy, Nuclear and Mining Research Institute (TENMAK) was established in March 2020. This organization unites the Research Institute of Rare Earths, the National Boron Research Institute, and the Turkish Atomic Energy Agency (TAEK). The 2007 law established TAEK to establish standards for the construction and operation of nuclear power plants; however, in July 2018, the NDK assumed most of TAEK’s responsibilities (see below).

The Electricity Market Law, which governs the responsibilities of all parties directly involved in the generation, transmission, distribution, wholesale and retail supply, import and export of electricity in Turkey, is the primary legislation that applies to the market for electricity. In order to create a more robust, stable, and open electricity market in Turkey, the law went into effect in March 2013. The previous electricity market law was replaced by the Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA) law, which established the organization (Enerji Piyasası Düzenleme Kurumu, or EPDK).

In addition to enforcing electricity market laws, the Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA or EPDK) grants licenses for production, transmission, distribution, and supply.

The state-owned Turkish Electricity Trade & Contract Corporation (TETAS) will buy the nuclear power for distribution. It operates alongside numerous private sector companies.

The Turkish Electricity Transmission Company (TEİA), a state-owned grid operator with a legally mandated monopoly on the country’s electricity transmission network, is in charge of managing the transmission of electricity.

Turkey is a signatory of the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability, and various amending protocols.

A small Triga research reactor has operated at the Istanbul Technical University since 1979. It is regulated by the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority.

Regulation, safety & non-proliferation

Turkey established the Nuclear Regulatory Authority, Nükleer Düzenleme Kurumu (NDK), in July 2018. It assumed many of TAEKs responsibilities, including regulation of nuclear power plants and all related fuel cycle activities. TAEK is now responsible solely for the disposal of nuclear waste.

Turkey became a member of the NPT in 1979, and since 1981, it has had a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. In 2001, the Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement came into effect.

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