Is Turkey Close to Ukraine? A Comprehensive Analysis of Geopolitical Proximity and Maritime Boundaries

Turkey, a prominent player in the region and a longstanding member of NATO, is negotiating a difficult path between its alliance obligations and its ties with Russia in order to safeguard its own national interests. There are strains in the relationship. The Western Balkans, which saw fighting in the 1990s, continue to serve as a battleground for pro-Western and pro-Russian forces. The rules of engagement differ in the Balkans. It is not entirely clear how events might play out in Turkey or the Western Balkans. Still, there are indications and track records.

Russia Could Foment Unrest in the Balkans

The Western Balkans deserve a more thorough discussion because of its influence on Russian strategy and the opportunities it presents for Russian meddling. History counts. Driving Putins revanchist ambitions is Russias long-standing fear of dismemberment.

The disintegration of the Balkans in the 1990s reinforced these fears. Moscow did not see the breakup of Yugoslavia as the result of complex ethnic and political dynamics, but instead as a U.S.-sponsored regime change. According to the Russian view, the United States encouraged political dissent, supported separatism, and funded dissidents against Yugoslavias central government, represented by Serbia, and used democratization, peacekeeping, and humanitarian concerns as pretexts for military intervention. The United States assisted Croatia and Bosnia during their wars with Serbia. Western NGOs provided regime opponents with humanitarian aid, while the United States sent private contractors (PDF) and military advisors to help train Croatias army. Initially, Washington abided by a UN arms embargo on all belligerents in Yugoslavia, but later—in response to legislation by Congress—partially suspended its enforcement efforts, allowing Croatia and Bosnia to receive arms shipments from other parties while continuing to block arms shipments to Serbia. The United States later suspended its compliance in order to send arms directly to the Bosnian defenders.

In response to ethnic cleansing and massacres of Muslims by Serb forces in Bosnia, direct military intervention followed. NATO imposed no-fly zones, shot down Yugoslav aircraft, and then, with UN approval, bombed Serb forces in Bosnia in 1995, and government targets in Serbia during the Kosovo War. The ultimate result of the Balkan wars was the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the reduction of pro-Russian Serbia, and ultimately the removal and trial of its leader, Slobodan Milosevic, for war crimes. This, Russians feared (PDF), was the blueprint for the dismemberment of Russia.

Since the Balkan wars, five countries have joined NATO: Albania, Croatia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Slovenia. All have applied for membership in the EU, which Croatia and Slovenia currently hold; candidates include Albania, Bosnia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia.

Due to Russia’s significant economic stake and continuous and intensive information operations, Russian influence in Serbia is still very strong.

But old hatreds are not easily subdued. Irreconcilable Serb separatists remain determined to secede from Bosnia. Following its war with Serbia, Kosovo stayed under international supervision for ten years before declaring its independence in 2008, a move that Serbia continues to reject. Once more, history matters: in 1389, a battle took place in Kosovo where Serb forces temporarily stopped the Ottoman forces’ advance. Tensions continue, and in 2022, Serbia and Kosovo almost went to war. Matters of corruption, rule of law, and human rights also remain obstacles. Until these issues are resolved, EU membership is off the table.

Due to Russia’s substantial economic stake and continuous and intensive information operations, Russian influence in Serbia is still very strong. Prior to the start of the conflict in Ukraine, the amount of money that Russian corporations controlled and the amount of revenues they generated accounted for one-third of the GDP of the nation. Russia has also used Hungary and Hungarian companies to extend its influence in the Balkans. The Serbian government has tried to sit on the fence in response to the war in Ukraine. While the country’s president claims sincerely that Serbia wants to join the EU, Serbia refuses to break its close ties to Moscow and participate in Western sanctions against the Russian Federation.

Some analysts think Russia may foment unrest in the region as a distraction. Europeans could not handle the earlier Balkans conflicts without U. S. military intervention, and now that the war in Ukraine has been added, more issues could erode European resolve, which is one of Putin’s main objectives. Historically, Russia has behaved aggressively in the Balkans. Assassinations and coup plots are possible. It is reasonable to anticipate that the EU will step up its diplomatic efforts to settle regional conflicts and quicken ascension talks in response to these threats.

Senior advisor to the president of the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation, Brian Michael Jenkins is the author of multiple books, reports, and articles on terrorism-related subjects.

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Turkey’s Response: Supportive Yet Ambivalent

Turkey swiftly prevented Russian warships from entering the Black Sea through the Dardanelles and Bosporus Straits after denouncing Russia’s invasion. Additionally, Turkey banned Russian military aircraft from passing through its borders, but Russian commercial flights between the two nations are still allowed. Ankara provided advanced drones to Ukraine, and it has assisted Ukraine in manufacturing its own drones.

Turkey does not belong to the EU and has not complied with US or EU economic sanctions against Russia, but it has declared it will uphold UN sanctions against Russia and said it will not attempt to get around them. Turkey’s central banks have halted the nation’s usage of the Russian Mir payment system, possibly in order to keep its own financial institutions safe from sanctions. Additionally, Turkey has made it easier for Azerbaijani natural gas to be shipped to Bulgaria, taking the place of Russian gas. That Azerbaijani gas is now Bulgarias only source.

Turkey has stated that it will never recognize Russia’s annexations of territory in Ukraine and that it supports the return of all occupied territory, including Crimea, to Ukraine. Additionally, Turkey helped arrange for the transfer of Ukrainian grain across the Black Sea and mediated prisoner exchanges between Russia and Ukraine.

At the same time, Turkey seems to be exploiting the situation for its own economic gains. Russian oligarchs remain unbothered in Turkey, and the country benefits from the flight of capital out of Russia and into Turkey in several ways: Russian tourism to Turkey remains strong, Turkish companies are currently angling to replace Western firms that have pulled out of Russia, and Turkish exports of chemicals, microchips, and other products that can be used to support Russias war effort—especially semiconductors used in weapons systems—is a cause of real concern.

There is reason for serious concern regarding Turkish exports of goods that could aid Russia’s war effort, such as microchips and chemicals.

Turkeys calibrated response to the war in Ukraine is consistent with its own strategic interests. Although Ankara recognizes that Russian control over Ukraine presents a long-term threat to Turkey, it is also concerned about the immediate future: what could Russia do right now to seriously jeopardize Turkey’s interests? A defeated, enraged, and unstable Russia could be just as dangerous. Turkey therefore wants Ukraine to triumph, but it does not want Russia to be forced into a corner or to disintegrate. And it wishes to accomplish all of this without jeopardizing Turkey’s strong ties to Moscow or disrupting Turkey’s commercial prospects with Europe. It is, indeed, a very narrow path.

When considering Turkey’s increasingly intimate defense cooperation with Russia, this well-calculated reaction is reason for mistrust. Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system in 2019 resulted in Turkey losing its eligibility to participate in the F-35 advanced fighter program. Turkey declared in 2021 that it was seeking additional cooperative weapons development projects with Russia, including the manufacture of fighter jets and submarines. Turkey announced in September 2022 that it would pursue full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a security and defense-focused organization founded by China and Russia. From Ankaras regional perspective, this is logical. This is awkward from a NATO standpoint because it directly impacts how reliable people believe Turkey to be an ally.

One immediate concern is Turkeys announcement that it will veto Sweden and Finlands accession to NATO. Turkey now demands that Sweden and Finland crack down on the activities of Turkish exiles—Kurdish separatists in particular, whom Ankara considers terrorists—before it would allow them to join NATO, despite the fact that Turkey has previously supported NATO expansion to eventually include both Ukraine and Georgia. Denying Sweden and Finland membership in NATO undermines NATOs ability to project unity and strength.

Another matter of concern is the protracted and intricate dispute between Turkey and the Kurdish people, which is outside the purview of this series. Still, quickly: Turkeys concern about Kurdish terrorists is legitimate. The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), the principal rebel group, has been listed as a terrorist organization by the European Union since 2004 and by the United States since 1997. Although PKK members and sympathisers are present throughout Europe, individuals will only be prosecuted for specific crimes by European courts; peaceful protests or political causes will not be prosecuted. Even then, convictions are often hard to come by. Turkeys frustration on this front is understandable.

However, Turkey complicates its own case by defining its foes too broadly, making little distinction between legitimate political activity and political violence. Its domestic response to Kurdish separatism has often been brutal. The European Court of Human Rights has condemned Turkey for numerous (PDF) human rights abuses against the Kurdish people, including arbitrary arrests, torture, and murders.

Turkeys government followed the same pattern against followers of Fethullah Gulen, who it blames for the attempted coup in 2016. In a massive purge, the government detained hundreds of thousands, arrested more than 100,000, and dismissed 150,000 public officials, including judges, teachers, and members of the armed forces for alleged membership in a terrorist organization, meaning they were all suspected of being Gulenists. The roundup included the detention of European and American citizens, whom Turkey then offered to trade for the return of Turkish exiles, fugitives abroad, or other concessions.

Given that NATO is stronger than it has ever been in many ways, Turkey’s actions seem even more petty and self-serving.

Stresses such as these are not new to NATO. The alliance has survived one coup in France, two in Greece, and three in Turkey. Greece temporarily left NATO in response to Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in 1974, and France left the organization’s military command structure from 1966 to 2009. Numerous NATO members encounter domestic opposition to the alliance, which has been expressed by a former US president who has publicly denigrated NATO and frequently indicated his desire to leave the alliance. And yet, the alliance has held, and Russias invasion of Ukraine has prompted a remarkable display of solidarity. In fact, NATO is stronger than it has ever been, which makes Turkey’s actions seem even more transactional and opportunistic.

When confronted with a significant external threat, military alliances are generally less stringent when it comes to their members’ financial and political hygiene as long as they support the shared defense. It is acknowledged that while shared values have recently gained importance, each member will have to weigh how much they can contribute to the endeavor without endangering their own survival. An alliance is an assemblage of militaries; it cannot be commanded like a rifle platoon. Sabotaging the allied effort, however, would be unallowable. The addition of Sweden and Finland will militarily and psychologically strengthen NATO at this critical moment. Declaring their intention to join NATO exposes Sweden and Finland to Russian retaliation, in the midst of a conflict with an unpredictable enemy, without the protection and deterrence provided by full NATO membership. However, even before formal accession, the United States, the United Kingdom, and other countries have made bilateral promises to support Sweden and Finland’s self-defense.

Undoubtedly, some of Turkey’s statements are just rhetoric and should be disregarded since they are essentially posturing by the country’s leadership to win support at home by inflaming nationalist feelings. But—if such rhetoric provokes enough backlash, it can backfire. On both sides—Turkey on one, the European Union and United States on the other—governments are getting testy.

In the summer of 2022, for example, Turkey complained that its citizens were increasingly being denied visas to travel in the European Union. Then, European nations and the United States issued travel advisories warning citizens about the threat of terrorism and arbitrary detentions in Turkey. Turkey promptly struck back, warning Turkish travelers of “dangerous levels of religious intolerance and hatred in Europe” and anti-foreign and racist violence in the United States. In January 2023, a bipartisan group of U.S. senators warned that Congress could not approve the sale of additional F-16s to Turkey until it ratified the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO. The exchanges reflect growing tensions.

Though it might not have an immediate impact on the conflict in Ukraine, the enormous earthquake that struck Turkey and Syria on February 6, 2023, might momentarily cool the heated rhetoric. As foreign aid pours into Turkey, policy differences have taken a backseat, and Ankara might be more inclined to refrain from making provocative remarks, at least temporarily. The government is preoccupied with handling the crisis, and in Turkey’s past, incidents of this nature have had an impact on internal politics.

War in Ukraine: Turkey closes access to Black Sea straits to warships • FRANCE 24 English