Despite the verbal escalation that resulted from the Gaza war between Ankara and Tel Aviv, relations between Israel and Turkey have endured because of their strong ties and commonalities.
Similar to how its response to the invasion of Ukraine shocked observers with its legalism and insistence on respecting Kiev’s sovereignty, Turkey’s initial cautious tone to the start of Israel’s war on Gaza surprised observers. As it has in the past, Ankara, which upholds solid and consistent relations with the two aggressor countries, has freely offered to mediate in both cases. In both cases too, the ambivalence detectable in that offer is not merely due to the conjuncture. It also illustrates the essence of that nation’s diplomacy, which throughout its history has frequently been forced to perform dangerous balancing acts.
When Hamas launched its surprise attack on October 7, 2023, Turkey and Israel were in the midst of a reconciliation process, following over ten years of tense relations that occasionally verged on divorce before enduring protracted periods of reconciliation. The capacity to manage this volatility is the first source of surprise. It is due to multiple convergences, political, strategic and above all economic. In light of the new circumstances brought about by the Israel-Palestine conflict taking center stage once again in the Middle East, what is the future of this complex relationship?
Turkey was the first Muslim nation to recognize Israel in 1949, not long after the Hebrew State was established, so the two nations have a long history of cooperation and mutual understanding. Their mutual relations have been extremely positive since the end of the bipolar world, with the exception of a few minor skirmishes during the cold war caused by the Israeli-Arab truces. Furthermore, it doesn’t seem that the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) ascent to power at the turn of the century questioned that “entente cordiale.” Ankara even hosted informal talks in 2008 that were intended to facilitate the normalization of relations between the Syrian regime and Israel, but the talks ultimately fell through.
The Turko-Israeli conflict started in 2009, but it was more about the new circumstances brought about by Hamas’s ascent to power in the Gaza Strip following the 2006 elections than it was about the Palestinian question. Ankara responded quickly to Israel’s first round of heavy bombings on the Palestinian enclave, known as “Operation Cast lead.” During the January 2009 Davos economic forum, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan sharply criticized Israeli President Shimon Pérès during a memorable panel discussion.
From then on, it appeared as though the newly elected Turkish government was getting closer to Hamas in an effort to include it as an official participant in the talks. A year later, when the Mavi Marmara, the flagship of a humanitarian flotilla organized by a Turkish Islamic organization, attempted to impose the Gaza blockade, Turkish-Israeli relations were in danger of collapsing completely. When the ship was intercepted, nine Turkish humanitarian workers were killed, and it seemed as though the relationship between the two nations would never recover.
But in a totally unprecedented move in 2013, Benyamin Netanyahu consented to give Erdoğan the apology he was demanding in order to mend their relationship. Hoover, the AKP leader criticized the 2014 “Protective Edge” airstrikes on Gaza, claiming that Israel had “outdone Hitler in barbarity,” jeopardizing this initiative. As a result, high-level diplomatic relations were not restored with an exchange of ambassadors until 2016, following the payment of compensation to the families of those killed in the humanitarian flotilla. But the truce would not last long.
The Great March of Return by the Gazans in 2019 was brutally suppressed, resulting in numerous Palestinian casualties. This led to a renewed verbal spat between the Israeli Prime Minister and the Turkish President. Following another decline in diplomatic ties, the two nations did not exchange ambassadors again until 2022, during a visit by Israeli President Isaac Herzog to Turkey. At that time, Ankara was attempting to resolve its differences with the Arab world, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates, and the latter seemed to be entering a phase of global convergence with Israel as a result of the Abraham accords.
What stands out about this ongoing argument now, more than its irregularity, is the resilience that ultimately kept the two main characters’ relationship intact. Because the tenuous ties between those two regional powers were not strengthened by the detention of a humanitarian ship, the increasingly frequent and severe airstrikes against Gaza, the intense verbal sparring between leaders, or the brutal suppression of Palestinian protests.
The recent escalation of violence between Israel and Hamas in Gaza has once again brought the complex relationship between Israel and Turkey into the spotlight. While both countries are strategically important to the United States and NATO, their divergent approaches to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have created significant tensions.
A History of Ups and Downs
Historically, Israel and Turkey have enjoyed a close relationship, marked by cooperation in areas such as security, intelligence sharing, and trade However, the relationship has been strained in recent years, particularly under the leadership of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Erdoğan has been a vocal critic of Israeli policies towards the Palestinians, particularly the 2008-2009 Gaza War and the 2014 Israel-Hamas conflict. He has accused Israel of committing “state terrorism” and has called for an end to the Israeli blockade of Gaza.
In 2010, the relationship between the two countries reached a low point when Israeli commandos raided a Turkish aid flotilla attempting to break the Gaza blockade killing ten Turkish citizens. The incident led to the recall of ambassadors and a freeze in diplomatic relations.
The Current Situation
In recent years, there have been some attempts to mend the relationship between Israel and Turkey. In 2016, the two countries signed an agreement normalizing diplomatic relations. However, the relationship remains fragile, and tensions have flared up again in the wake of the recent conflict in Gaza.
In May 2021, Israel launched a military operation in Gaza in response to rocket attacks by Hamas. The operation lasted 11 days and resulted in the deaths of over 250 Palestinians and 13 Israelis.
Erdoğan condemned the Israeli operation as “genocide” and called for an international intervention to stop the violence. He also recalled the Turkish ambassador to Israel and expelled the Israeli ambassador to Turkey.
The current situation is characterized by a high level of mistrust and animosity between the two countries. Erdoğan has accused Israel of “ethnic cleansing” and has called for a boycott of Israeli products. Israeli officials have accused Turkey of supporting Hamas and of inciting violence against Israel.
The US Role
The United States has a strong interest in maintaining good relations with both Israel and Turkey. The US considers Israel to be a key ally in the Middle East and Turkey to be a vital NATO member.
The Biden administration has attempted to mediate between the two countries and has urged them to de-escalate the situation. However, the US has also been critical of Erdoğan’s rhetoric, which it has said is unhelpful.
The Future of the Relationship
The future of the relationship between Israel and Turkey is uncertain. The two countries have a history of cooperation, but their divergent approaches to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continue to be a major source of tension.
If the two countries are to improve their relationship, they will need to find a way to bridge their differences on this issue. This will require a willingness to compromise and a commitment to dialogue.
The relationship between Israel and Turkey is complex and multifaceted. While the two countries share some common interests, their divergent approaches to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have created significant tensions. The future of the relationship is uncertain, but it is clear that the two countries will need to find a way to bridge their differences if they are to improve their relationship.
Frequently Asked Questions
Are Israel and Turkey allies?
The relationship between Israel and Turkey is complex and has been strained in recent years. While the two countries have a history of cooperation, their divergent approaches to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have created significant tensions.
What are the main points of contention between Israel and Turkey?
The main points of contention between Israel and Turkey are the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Turkey’s support for Hamas.
What is the US role in the relationship between Israel and Turkey?
The US has a strong interest in maintaining good relations with both Israel and Turkey. The US considers Israel to be a key ally in the Middle East and Turkey to be a vital NATO member.
What is the future of the relationship between Israel and Turkey?
The future of the relationship between Israel and Turkey is uncertain. The two countries have a history of cooperation, but their divergent approaches to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continue to be a major source of tension.
Additional Resources
In the Shadow of Gaza
Despite the verbal escalation that resulted from the Gaza war between Ankara and Tel Aviv, relations between Israel and Turkey have endured because of their strong ties and commonalities.
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Translated from French by Noël Burch.
Similar to how its response to the invasion of Ukraine shocked observers with its legalism and insistence on respecting Kiev’s sovereignty, Turkey’s initial cautious tone to the start of Israel’s war on Gaza surprised observers. As it has in the past, Ankara, which upholds solid and consistent relations with the two aggressor countries, has freely offered to mediate in both cases. In both cases too, the ambivalence detectable in that offer is not merely due to the conjuncture. It also illustrates the essence of that nation’s diplomacy, which throughout its history has frequently been forced to perform dangerous balancing acts.
When Hamas launched its surprise attack on October 7, 2023, Turkey and Israel were in the midst of a reconciliation process, following over ten years of tense relations that occasionally verged on divorce before enduring protracted periods of reconciliation. The capacity to manage this volatility is the first source of surprise. It is due to multiple convergences, political, strategic and above all economic. In light of the new circumstances brought about by the Israel-Palestine conflict taking center stage once again in the Middle East, what is the future of this complex relationship?
Turkey was the first Muslim nation to recognize Israel in 1949, not long after the Hebrew State was established, so the two nations have a long history of cooperation and mutual understanding. Their mutual relations have been extremely positive since the end of the bipolar world, with the exception of a few minor skirmishes during the cold war caused by the Israeli-Arab truces. Furthermore, it doesn’t seem that the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) ascent to power at the turn of the century questioned that “entente cordiale.” Ankara even hosted informal talks in 2008 that were intended to facilitate the normalization of relations between the Syrian regime and Israel, but the talks ultimately fell through.
The Turko-Israeli conflict started in 2009, but it was more about the new circumstances brought about by Hamas’s ascent to power in the Gaza Strip following the 2006 elections than it was about the Palestinian question. Ankara responded quickly to Israel’s first round of heavy bombings on the Palestinian enclave, known as “Operation Cast lead.” During the January 2009 Davos economic forum, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan sharply criticized Israeli President Shimon Pérès during a memorable panel discussion.
From then on, it appeared as though the newly elected Turkish government was getting closer to Hamas in an effort to include it as an official participant in the talks. A year later, when the Mavi Marmara, the flagship of a humanitarian flotilla organized by a Turkish Islamic organization, attempted to impose the Gaza blockade, Turkish-Israeli relations were in danger of collapsing completely. When the ship was intercepted, nine Turkish humanitarian workers were killed, and it seemed as though the relationship between the two nations would never recover.
But in a totally unprecedented move in 2013, Benyamin Netanyahu consented to give Erdoğan the apology he was demanding in order to mend their relationship. Hoover, the AKP leader criticized the 2014 “Protective Edge” airstrikes on Gaza, claiming that Israel had “outdone Hitler in barbarity,” jeopardizing this initiative. As a result, high-level diplomatic relations were not restored with an exchange of ambassadors until 2016, following the payment of compensation to the families of those killed in the humanitarian flotilla. But the truce would not last long.
The Great March of Return by the Gazans in 2019 was brutally suppressed, resulting in numerous Palestinian casualties. This led to a renewed verbal spat between the Israeli Prime Minister and the Turkish President. Following another decline in diplomatic ties, the two nations did not exchange ambassadors again until 2022, during a visit by Israeli President Isaac Herzog to Turkey. At that time, Ankara was attempting to resolve its differences with the Arab world, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates, and the latter seemed to be entering a phase of global convergence with Israel as a result of the Abraham accords.
What stands out about this ongoing argument now, more than its irregularity, is the resilience that ultimately kept the two main characters’ relationship intact. Because the tenuous ties between those two regional powers were not strengthened by the detention of a humanitarian ship, the increasingly frequent and severe airstrikes against Gaza, the intense verbal sparring between leaders, or the brutal suppression of Palestinian protests.
The role of the Jewish community
Finding the enduring structure of Turkish-Israeli relations is crucial to comprehending how they have endured and been periodically resurrected. The solidity of their economic ties constitutes the first axis of that continuity. To demonstrate this, all we have to do is recall that Turkey increased its exports to Israel by threefold during the turbulent years we just discussed, rising from two 3 billion dollars in 2011 to 7. 03 billion in 2022. Providing 5. 2% of the country’s imports, Turkey is thus Israel’s fifth-largest supplier and its seventh-largest customer for 2. 2% of its exports, to the tune of 2. 5 billion dollars per annum. These trade relations concern vital domains. Leading the list of Israeli imports from Turkey are steel, iron, textiles, motor vehicles, and cement; not to be forgotten is Azerbaijani oil, which travels via the Caucus and Eastern Anatolia via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (BTC) to the Ceyhan harbor, covering %2040% of Israel’s annual consumption of brut The Turkish corporation Zorlu also provides 7% of Israel’s electricity. As for Israel, its exports to Turkey consist mostly of chemical products and high-tech equipment. These have been crucial in recent years to the modernization of Turkish industrial production, particularly in the production of weapons.
Another element of the relationship between these two countries that aids in overcoming the whims of their reciprocal relationships is a shared historical memory. Jews were among the “Millets”2 of the Ottoman Empire, providing sanctuary to Sephardi Jews who were expelled from Spain in the fifteenth century, particularly in its famous port cities (Salonica, Istanbul, Izmir, etc.). Based on meticulous observation of their linguistic and cultural specificities, they maintain one of the last Jewish communities in the Muslim world, despite the unequal situation that has been theirs since the Turkish Republic’s founding, as evidenced by numerous anti-Semitic incidents during and after World War II. Recently, the Turkish TV series Kulup demonstrated this. This history and the current climate have contributed to the influx of Israeli tourists to Turkey, who, in spite of the numerous crises that have occurred, continue to travel there and constitute, before October 2023, one of the nation’s greatest numbers of foreign visitors.
Lastly, despite the contentious atmosphere encircling their relationship, we cannot undervalue the significance of the shared strategic objectives between the two nations. Turkey is still an ally of the West because it is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and is home to several significant bases: the anti-ballistic missile radar station at Kürecik, which is primarily aimed towards Iran; the headquarters for the allied land forces of the Alliance’s southern flank at Izmir; and the Incirlik airport, which acts as a relay for the transfer of military hardware to Israel when needed. Ankara joined the anti-missile European Sky Shield Initiative in February 2024. The initiative was based on a German initiative from 2023 and was backed by 17 other nations. This project, shunned by France, will use among other equipment, the Israeli long-range Arrow 3 missiles.
Besides which, neither country is about abandoning its lasting conflict with Syria. Ankara has seized control of land straddling its border with Syria following a series of military interventions in 2018. Despite its claims to have no irredentist goals, Ankara has been administering and equipping these areas ever since. Its main goal is to stop the People’s Protection Units (YPG), a Kurdish militia connected to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), from being established. Regarding Israel, its army routinely launches strikes against the positions of the Syrian regime and its regional allies, the Lebanese Hezbollah, within the framework of the ongoing conflicts, with Russian approval when needed.
Despite significant differences between the two nations’ officials regarding their commitments in the Caucuses, a strategic convergence was evident in 2020 during the second Nagorno-Karabakh war, wherein both gave Azerbaijan vital military support and ultimately enabled it to retake control of the Armenian enclave.