Are There Nukes in Turkey? A Comprehensive Analysis

Should the U. S. The question has become more pressing in light of Turkey’s invasion of Syria, Erdogan’s growing authoritarian leadership and growing rift with NATO, Trump’s incapacity to oversee U.S. S. security concerns in the Middle East and Europe, as well as in war-torn Syria just a few hundred miles from the biggest U.S. S. nuclear weapons storage site in Europe.

The New York Times reports that last weekend, officials from the State and Energy Departments (?) discreetly reviewed the plans for withdrawing the weapons from Incirlik. “Those weapons, one senior official said, were now essentially Erdogan’s hostages. To fly them out of Incirlik would be to mark the de facto end of the Turkish-American alliance. To keep them there, though, is to perpetuate a nuclear vulnerability that should have been eliminated years ago. ”.

That review is long overdue! [In fact, since the 2016 coup attempt, I’ve heard there have been multiple reviews and a heated internal debate.] [A number of us have been calling for withdrawal for years (see here and here), but officials have refused, claiming that the deployment still had value and that things weren’t as bad as they appeared. They were wrong. Furthermore, the United States has put itself in a situation where it must decide between nuclear security and leaving Turkey, making the decision needlessly dire and urgent as a result of delaying action for so long.

The fact that Incirlik is expected to receive a sizable shipment of the brand-new B61-12 guided nuclear bomb in a few years makes the situation even more unsustainable and would recommit Turkey to nuclear deployment.

This year is the 60th anniversary of the first deployment of nuclear weapons to Turkey. It is time to bring them home.

The most recent and reliable confirmation that nuclear weapons are still kept at the base is the officials’ explicit mention of the weapons in the New York Times article. That validates what I’ve been hearing, and US Air Forces Europe sources attested to the report, informing William Arkin that the weapons remain in place. After the 2016 coup attempt, there have been rumors that the weapons were taken down (including some very false information that stated they had been moved to Romania). All of those rumors were wrong. The purpose of the 39th Operations Support Squadron is indeed to “orchestrate and control US, Turkish, and coalition forces operating at Incirlik Airbase in the execution of full-spectrum airpower and nuclear deterrent operations,” according to an article on the official website of the Incirlik Air Base (emphasis added). Since I’ve brought this to their attention, the article will probably be taken down, but it is included below in its entirety:

For the past few years, I have calculated that the Air Force maintains approximately 50 B61 nuclear gravity bombs at Incirlik, which accounts for one-third of the 150 nuclear weapons presently stationed in Europe (refer to the figure below). This estimate has been used by a wide range of news reports and commentators. The number of bombs at Incirlik has decreased over the past two decades from 90 in 2000. In those days, 40 of the 90 bombs were earmarked for delivery by Turkish F-16s. When the US Air Force withdrew its Munition Support Squadrons from the Turkish bases in 1996, the 40 bombs were transferred to Incirlik from their previous locations in six vaults at Akinci AB and Balikesir AB (20 at each). The forty “Turkish” bombs were kept at Incirlik until approximately 2005, when the Bush administration’s unilateral nuclear reduction in Europe saw their return to the United States.

US jets will use the remaining 50 bombs, despite Turkey’s refusal to permit the US Air Force to establish a permanent fighter-squadron base at Incirlik. The weapons would need to be transported to different locations prior to use, or jets would need to fly in during a crisis to retrieve them. Because of this, over the past 20 years, Incirlik’s nuclear posture has been more of a storage location than a fighter-bomber base.

The removal of the “Turkish” weapons reduced (some would say mothballed) Turkey’s participation in the NATO nuclear sharing mission, but the Turkish F-16s continued to play a nuclear role. The US Air Force told Congress in 2010 that “Turkey uses Turkish F-16s to execute their nuclear mission,” despite local reports to the contrary. Some of the F-16s would be upgraded to be able to deliver the new B61-12 bomb until the F-35A could take over the nuclear strike mission in the 2020s. That is now not going to happen after the Trump administration canceled the F-35 sale.

Satellite images from 2015 showed that most of the aircraft shelters housing nuclear weapons storage vaults had a new security perimeter built around them. Only twenty-one of the twenty-five shelters that had vaults at first were part of the new security area, which could hold a maximum of eighty-four nuclear bombs. Typically, each vault holds only two bombs, for a total of 40–50 bombs in inventory at Incirlik.

As recently as last month, Vice Chief Staff of the Air Force, Gen. Stephen W. Wilson, visited Incirlik and was given tours of the various functions and facilities at the base. One of these was the “NATO Area”‘s Protective Aircraft Shelter H-2, where he had a conversation with 39th Security Force personnel tasked with guarding the nuclear weapons (see below). He was likely also shown the inside of the shelter and the weapons in the vault.

The Air Force’s decision to remove the B61 bombs from Incirlik would resemble the actions that Maxar’s satellites photographed in 2019 and 2017. Those s show what appears to be either actual nuclear weapons movements or training to remove them.

A picture from March 22, 2019, depicts a C-17 transport plane parked directly outside the NATO Area’s main gate. The plane is most likely from the 4th Airlift Squadron of the 62nd Airlift Wing at Joint Base Lewis-McChord in Washington. Prime Nuclear Airlift Force (PNAF) and Emergency Nuclear Airlift Operations (ENAO) missions are flown by the 4th Airlift Squadron, the only Air Force unit qualified to airlift nuclear weapons (see s below).

The satellite image displays the C-17 and gate area encircled by 39th Security Force armored vehicles, armed guards, and technicians to facilitate and safeguard weapon movement. One of the unusual cars observed is an eighteen-meter truck positioned in line with the C-17 loading pad. A few months later, the weapons maintenance unit building has the same kind of truck parked there (see below).

Another set of Maxar satellite photos of a possible nuclear weapons movement or exercise is from December 2017. A Nuclear Security Inspection that year (and 2014) reportedly included weapons emergency evacuation drills. Similar circumstances existed in 2017 and 2019: a C-17 parked outside the gate, security cars encircling the area, and transporters for moving weapons. But the 2017 photos are unique because they were taken moments apart as the satellite passed overhead. Movements then become apparent: On the first, a possible weapons trailer is approaching the NATO Area’s outer gate while being towed behind a truck in a line of armored security vehicles. The towed trailer is turning toward the back of the C-17 in the second picture, which shows the column having passed through the gate and onto the tarmac. The aircraft shadow shows the loading ramp is open and ready to receive the weapons (see below).

It was long overdue for the B61 nuclear bombs at Incirlik to be removed, but bureaucratic inertia, Cold War mindset, and tradition kept officials from acting appropriately. The United States must now decide whether to secure its weapons or risk appearing to be abandoning Turkey as the situation has reached a breaking point.

Withdrawing the weapons does not, of course, mean the United States is abandoning Turkey. Maintaining the weapons at Incirlik in the hopes that it will somehow stop Turkey from further straying from NATO is probably a pipe dream, as that relationship is already in grave danger. Whether or not there are nuclear weapons at Incirlik, the relationship is likely to deteriorate because it appears like that boat has sailed. That is the reality the Air Force must relate to now.

The fact that their departure from Turkey will make Belgium, Germany, Holland, and Italy—the other participants in the so-called nuclear sharing arrangement—question why they should keep storing U.S. S. nuclear weapons. There is a claim that withdrawing from Turkey could lead to withdrawals from other nations as well.

But the withdrawal of U. S. The deployment of nuclear weapons by Greece in 2001 and England five years later did not lead the other nations to call for NATO’s dissolution or their own withdrawal. If they truly believe deployment of U. S. nuclear weapons is important for NATO security, then they will stay. They clearly don’t think it’s important and the weapons should be withdrawn from all the countries regardless if the mission fails with the withdrawal from Turkey. The U. S. Europe can sustain a sufficiently strong extended deterrence posture with sophisticated conventional forces supported by strategic forces operating in the background.

The B61 bombs at Incirlik could easily be dispersed to empty storage vaults in the other countries. Space is not a problem. In total, the active WS3 vaults located in Belgium, Germany, Holland, and Italy have 96 vacant weapon slots. Moreover, there are 25 empty and inactive WS3 vaults with room for 100 bombs at RAF Lakenheath. But public and parliamentary opposition would likely prevent increasing the number of nuclear bombs stored in those countries. It appears more likely that the bombs would be brought back to the United States if the order is issued to evacuate Incirlik.

Some will contend that the United States is prevented from reducing, if not completely withdrawing, its tactical nuclear weapons from Europe by Moscow’s purportedly increased reliance on a so-called “escalate-to-deescalate” strategy that involves using weapons of mass destruction first. Oddly enough, those same individuals also contend that, in order to more effectively counter Russian tactical nuclear weapons, the United States should equip its attack submarines with new nuclear cruise missiles and its strategic submarines with new low-yield warheads. This line of thinking was recently supported by the Nuclear Posture Review of the Trump administration. That appears to be a signal to the allies of Europe that other and more potent weapons are required and that the United States actually no longer finds the deployment of B61 nuclear bombs in Europe to be credible.

Whatever one might think about U. S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, Turkey is no longer an acceptable location. Turkey’s standing as a dependable NATO ally is fast being undermined by Erdogan’s confrontational and autocratic leadership, and the physical security of the Incirlik weapons is actually in danger due to the region’s worsening security. That threat is real and the U. S. military sees it as real. So much so that, according to a USAF source, Ohio Army National Guard military police were reportedly sent to Incirlik specifically to increase base security, and an additional security force squadron deployed to Incirlik from Aviano Air Base in Italy to beef up nuclear security in response to “regional turmoil and government instability.”

The weapons at Incirlik face an immediate security threat, and it is not acceptable or consistent with U.S. policy to keep nuclear weapons there. S. nuclear security standards. If you don’t believe that, ask yourself this question: If there were no U. S. nuclear weapons in Turkey and someone asked for them to be deployed to Incirlik, would the Pentagon approve?.

I doubt it. Prior to having to flee under fire, it is time to face reality and remove the weapons from Turkey.

This publication was made possible by generous contributions from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the New Land Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, and the Prospect Hill Foundation. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors. publications.

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