Is Turkey an ally of Israel? The answer is not as simple as a yes or no. The relationship between these two countries has been complex and often strained, particularly in recent years. While they share a common history and have enjoyed periods of close cooperation, their divergent views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have created significant friction.
A Historical Perspective:
Turkey and Israel established diplomatic relations in 1949 shortly after Israel’s independence. Initially the relationship was characterized by mutual respect and cooperation. Turkey was one of the first Muslim-majority countries to recognize Israel, and the two countries enjoyed strong economic and military ties.
However, tensions began to rise in the 1960s and 1970s, fueled by the Arab-Israeli wars and Turkey’s growing support for the Palestinian cause. The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon further strained relations, leading to a temporary suspension of diplomatic ties.
The Erdoğan Era:
The relationship between Turkey and Israel took a significant turn for the worse under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who became Prime Minister in 2003 and President in 2014. Erdoğan is a vocal critic of Israel’s policies towards the Palestinians and has accused Israel of committing “state terrorism.”
In 2010, the Mavi Marmara incident, in which Israeli forces raided a Turkish aid flotilla attempting to break the blockade of Gaza, resulted in the deaths of ten Turkish citizens and a complete breakdown in diplomatic relations.
The Current Crisis:
The recent escalation of violence between Israel and Hamas in Gaza has further exacerbated tensions between Turkey and Israel. Erdoğan has condemned Israel’s actions in the strongest terms, calling them “genocide” and accusing Israel of “massacring innocent civilians.”
Turkey has recalled its ambassador from Israel and has called for an international intervention to stop the violence. Israel, in turn, has accused Turkey of inciting violence and supporting terrorism.
The Future of the Relationship:
The future of the relationship between Turkey and Israel remains uncertain. The current level of tension is unprecedented, and it is unclear how the two countries will be able to repair their relationship.
Some analysts believe that a change in leadership in either country could lead to a thaw in relations. Others believe that the deep ideological differences between the two countries make it unlikely that they will ever be close allies again.
The relationship between Turkey and Israel is a complex one, marked by both cooperation and conflict. The recent escalation of violence in Gaza has further strained the relationship, and it is unclear how the two countries will be able to move forward.
Additional Resources:
- Wikipedia: Israel–Turkey relations
- Brookings Institution: Understanding Turkey’s response to the Israel-Gaza crisis
- Turkey
- Israel
- Israeli-Palestinian conflict
- Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
- Gaza
- Hamas
- Mavi Marmara incident
- Genocide
- State terrorism
- International intervention
FAQs:
- Are Turkey and Israel allies?
- The relationship between Turkey and Israel is complex and has been strained in recent years. While they share a common history and have enjoyed periods of close cooperation, their divergent views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have created significant friction.
- What is the current state of the relationship between Turkey and Israel?
- The current state of the relationship between Turkey and Israel is very tense. The two countries have recalled their ambassadors and have accused each other of inciting violence and supporting terrorism.
- What is the future of the relationship between Turkey and Israel?
- The future of the relationship between Turkey and Israel is uncertain. Some analysts believe that a change in leadership in either country could lead to a thaw in relations. Others believe that the deep ideological differences between the two countries make it unlikely that they will ever be close allies again.
Additional Notes:
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Turkey’s relationship with Israel and the Palestinian territories
KEVIN HUGGARD: How does this matter fit into Turkey’s larger foreign policy? What stance has Turkey historically taken toward Israeli-Palestinian affairs under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan?
ASLI AYDINTA\BA: Erdoğan’s vision for Turkey revolves around the Palestinian issue to the forefront.
Turkey and Israel, the two non-Arab states in the region, have been enthralled with each other for a considerable amount of their 74-year relationship.
But over the past two decades under Erdoğan, relations have been tumultuous, often in parallel with the ups and downs in Israeli-Palestinian tensions. In 2009, Erdoğan walked out of a panel with Shimon Peres in Davos after accusing the former Israeli president of killing children. In 2010, a Turkish aid flotilla tried to break the blockade of Gaza, leading to a deadly Israeli raid and years of cold peace between the two countries.
Despite the fact that relations between Turkey and Israel were restored in 2022, they have deteriorated significantly since Israel’s military actions in Gaza and the October 7 attack by Hamas. Although trade relations remain, Erdoğan has adopted a very tough stance against Israel, and both nations have recalled their ambassadors.
Turkey’s stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has changed significantly under Erdoğan from the Kemalist era prior to him in two areas.
The first is Erdoğan’s belief in the legitimacy of Hamas as a viable Palestinian actor, which is a natural outcome of his ideological affinity for the Muslim Brotherhood. Erdoğan believes Hamas needs to be part of the political process and has moved the Turkish establishment toward that idea. Hamas has had a presence in Turkey and sent delegations there since it won the Palestinian elections in 2006. I should note that Ankara’s engagement is with Hamas’ political wing; as far as I know, there has been no Turkish support for the group’s military wing in Gaza. But Erdoğan has been open about his political support for Hamas — whose political representatives were reportedly in Turkey at the time of the attack.
Another distinction from the pre-Erdoğan age is the central role of the Palestinian issue in Turkey’s aspirations for regional leadership — and Erdoğan’s use of neo-Ottomanism to sell that idea to Turkish voters. The Turkish president has built his political platform on the theme of an ascending Turkey — with a historic responsibility to protect the dispossessed Muslim populations in the region, including, of course, the Palestinians. This notion of Turkish exceptionalism runs through all of Erdoğan’s foreign policy speeches and is at the core of his “Century of Turkey” platform. It also works well domestically for the voters: Erdoğan is the only leader standing up to Israel and the West, we are often told. This is how he wants to be remembered, as the leader who oversaw the rebirth of the Turkish empire and who hasn’t forgotten the Palestinians and Jerusalem.
Turkish elite vs. societal opinion
KEVIN HUGGARD: To what degree are the demands of the Turkish people at large driving the country’s political leadership, as opposed to the demands of the bottom up?
ASLI AYDINTABAŞ: There’s no denying that the public is sympathetic to the Palestinian cause and extremely sensitive to this issue. For the average person, the suffering in Gaza is constantly covered, and there is constant commentary suggesting that Israel is only able to carry out these actions because the US permits it.
Public criticism of Hamas in the early days after the October 7 carnage is long gone. In public discourse, the oppressor and the oppressed are portrayed in stark black and white, with little room for nuance and little recollection of the events of October 7. There is also growing anti-Americanism for what is perceived as the United States’ blank check for Israel.
By arguing that Hamas is not a terrorist group, Erdoğan reinforces those feelings and gives the group some degree of legitimacy. By doing this, he has been able to shape the public’s perception of the problem. Specifically, according to Metropoll polling data, only 3% of respondents think that Hamas is a terrorist organization.
This conflict has also allowed Erdoğan to make a case about a civilizational rift with the West. He calls it “crusader vs crescent” and of course, Turkey is on the side of the crescent. I’m concerned that an increasing number of Turks are beginning to believe this civilizational narrative and view Turkey as distinct from the liberal order, which is characterized as immoral, prejudiced, and contradictory. I think Turkish society is getting closer to the idea of a non-aligned Turkey as a result of the Gaza conflict.