Turkey and Iran: Navigating Complexities in a Delicate Dance of Cooperation and Rivalry

The South Caucasus has long been a theatre of Turkish and Iranian cooperation and rivalry. While these two regional powers have historically balanced their inter­ests, there are signs that rivalry is taking precedence. Turkey’s unwavering backing of Azer­baijan during the 2020 Karabakh War consolidated Ankara’s footprint in the region. The reoccupation of the remaining portion of Karabakh by Azerbaijan in the most recent military operations on September 19, 2023, increases the likelihood of a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia, advancing Turkey’s objectives and possibly reducing Russia’s influence in the area. However, the prospect of a “less Russia, more Turkey” dynamic heightens Tehran’s apprehensions towards Ankara. The provision in the November 2020 ceasefire mediated by Moscow that requires the reconstruction of a road and rail link between Turkey and mainland Azerbaijan via the Nakhchivan exclave of Azerbaijan and the southeast Syunik province of Armenia is especially worrisome for Iran; this could marginalize Iran. Furthermore, Tehran is watching with concern as relations between Israel, Iran’s main adversary, and Azerbaijan, Turkey’s close ally, strengthen.

Iran is becoming more uneasy with the changes to the South Caucasus status quo, which benefited Turkey. Although Turkey has been content with Russia holding the lion’s share of power in the South Caucasus, there are growing doubts about the Kremlin’s formerly all-encompassing influence in the area. On November 9, 2020, Moscow was successful in mediating a cease-fire between Armenia and Azerbaijan during the Second Karabakh War. However, with Washington and Brussels involved in the peace negotiations, Russia has lost its monopoly over negotiations with Armenia and Azerbaijan since the end of 2021. After the most recent escalation on September 19, 2023, Russian peacekeeping forces helped Baku and the Karabakh Armenians agree to a ceasefire the following day. However, it is still unclear how Russia will handle its strained ties with Armenia, its sole official ally in the South Caucasus

The outcomes of what Baku referred to as “local antiterrorist measures” highlighted further conflictual dynamics in the area, particularly in relation to the potential Zangezur Corridor, which would connect Turkey and Azerbaijan through the geographically isolated Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan, which is bordered by Iran and Armenia. Once realised, it would grant Turkey direct land access to the Caspian region and Central Asia. However, Iran is concerned that the Zangezur Corridor will compromise its vital role as a transit route between Turkey and Central Asia, Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan, and among members of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) generally, undermining its geo-economic significance and regional influence.

Iran supported the “3 3” initiative in 2021 in an effort to capitalize on changes taking place in its neighborhood and fit into the changing regional order. The goal of this cooperation format was to bring together Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Iran to collaborate on regional security, economic, and transportation issues. The Astana trio, consisting of Moscow, Ankara, and Tehran, seems to have been aiming to apply such cooperative coordination methods in the South Caucasus as well, having gained substantial experience in regional conflict management in Syria. Nonetheless, Iran’s expectations were left unmet, fur­ther complicating its position and exposing it to Turkey’s new regional aspirations. As a result, Iran is witnessing a decline in influence in the South Caucasus while Turkey, its longtime rival, gains ground.

The long-standing military alliance between Turkey and Azerbaijan, along with their strategic infrastructure partnerships in the rail and energy industries, highlight Ankara’s importance in the South Caucasus. Furthermore, Turkey enjoys a particularly advantageous position within the geopolitical landscape of the region relative to Iran because of its unique role as the pivot that serves as the Organization of Turkic States’ means of connecting the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

In the 2020 conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Karabakh and seven surrounding regions that Armenia has occupied since the First Karabakh War of the 1990s, Baku’s victory depended heavily on Ankara’s military support. In June 2021, Azerbaijan and Turkey signed the Shusha Declaration on Allied Relations, solidifying their close relationship. Turkey security experts have described their close defense cooperation as “two states, one military.”

Ankara views Baku as a vital gateway to the South Caucasus and Central Asia, while Baku can rely on Ankara to bolster its military might. Turkey’s South Caucasus connections, made possible by Azerbaijan, include a number of strategically important cooperative schemes, such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, and the Southern Gas Corridor, which encompasses the Trans-Anatolian (TANAP), Trans-Adriatic (TAP), and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) natural gas pipelines. Fur­ther­more, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia conduct trilateral military trainings on an annual basis.

For Ankara, the South Caucasus also represents a bridge to Central Asia. Turkey’s current foreign policy views Central Asia and the South Caucasus as one region that is interconnected, if not indivisible. According to Ankara, these areas were the foundation of the “Turkic World,” which stretched “from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China.”

Making use of the Turkic connection, the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States was founded in 2009; aside from Turkey, its observers included Hungary, Turkmenistan, and North Cyprus. Other members of the intergovernmental body included Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. The Organization of Turkic States replaced the Council in 2021, signifying the expanding agenda of the “Turkic World.” Indeed, according to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, the Zangezur Cor­ridor is ex­pected to “unite the entire Turkic world”.

Iran’s ties with the region

Iran’s historical-cultural ties and geopoliti­cal engagement with the South Caucasus anchor its connections with the region. From Tehran’s perspective, mutual bonds with Azerbaijan are reinforced through the nations’ shared Shiite faith and close cul­tural ties – as observed in the presence of millions of ethnic Azeris in Iran. Regional ties are also coupled with the historical in­te­gration of Armenians into Iranian society.

Geopolitically, the South Caucasus became more important to Iran following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Iran tried to exert influence over its newly sovereign neighbour Azerbaijan by highlighting cul­tural and religious affinities but this policy backfired, only arousing apprehension in Azerbaijan. It also coincided with Baku’s increasing cooperation with the West, a dynamic that Iran perceived as threatening.

In response, Iran adopted a pro-Arme­nian position to counterbalance Baku, a strategy that was observed during the First Karabakh War of the 1990s. At the same time, Iran strived to mediate peace, a policy that it maintained until the Second Kara­bakh War in 2020. Until that point, Iran primarily acted to preserve the status quo in the region, exerting influence over Armenia as its sole southern route and significant neighbour aside from Russia. Additionally, Tehran had leverage over Baku as it was the only way that Azerbaijan could access its Nakhchivan exclave with­out passing through Armenia.

However, during the 2020 Karabakh War, Iran notably shifted its stance in favour of Azerbaijan, abandoning its pre­vious pro-Yerevan approach. Prominent Iranian figures, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, openly sup­ported Azerbaijan’s “liberation” of Arme­nian-controlled territories, character­ising them as “Muslim lands under occu­pation”. This change was primarily moti­vated by the calculation that Azerbaijan would likely emerge victorious in the con­flict. By siding with the presumed winner, Iran sought to position itself advantageously in the post-war arrangements.

Moreover, Iran faced a delicate situation in which siding against Azerbaijan could have had adverse consequences. Firstly, Azer­­baijan’s status as a fellow Muslim country made it challenging for Iran to adopt an openly oppositional stance. Secondly, Tehran was concerned about potential backlash emerging from its ethnic-Azeri population given their ties to Azerbaijan.

Despite its shifted position in favour of Azerbaijan, Iran’s expectations that a post-war settlement would safeguard its security and economic interests were not fully met. Tehran sought to be included in post-war economic projects and it desired assurance against potential threats from Israel, which had gained influence in the South Caucasus by providing Baku with significant military support. Since these aspirations were not realised, some speculate that Iran might return to a more pro-Armenia approach in its foreign policy. Indicators of this change include the establishment of an Iranian con­sulate in Armenia’s Syunik region and a notable increase in high-level meetings between Iranian and Armenian officials.

Iran’s relations with Turkey in the South Caucasus have changed significantly since the Second Karabakh War, which has reduced Iran’s relative influence in the region when compared to its long-standing adversary The Russia-mediated post-war agreements between Baku and Yerevan marked a shift away from the previously Russia-dominated regional order. This shift signals the beginning of a more multipolar environment in which the Turkey-Azerbaijan axis will become increasingly important, upending the long-standing status quo that Iran had long enjoyed. The old order limited Turkey’s influence and prevented Western powers from gaining a solid foothold in the area. The emergence of the new post-war multilateral regional order, how­ever, has exposed Iran to new potential threats.

On the one hand, Iran is deeply frustrated by Turkey’s growing trade and energy co­operation with Azerbaijan and Georgia, as it has chipped away at Iran’s economic significance – or relevance – in the region, especially in the face of US sanc­tions that are already isolating Iran from global markets. On the other hand, Iran has been increasingly worried about what it perceives as Turkey’s “pan-Turkist” agenda in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, fearing the potential ramifications this could have with respect to its own Turkic/Azeri-populated regions.

Once again, Tehran is deeply concerned about Ankara’s support of Baku’s plans to establish the Zangezur Corridor that would bypass Iran and directly link Turkey with Central Asia via Armenia and Azerbaijan. For Azerbaijan and Turkey, this question is now becoming a priority as signalled by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during his speech at the annual UN General Assembly in New York on 20 September 2023 in which he expressed the hope that this would be achieved “without delay”.

Iran stands to lose two geopolitical advantages as a result of the proposed Zangezur Corridor: its direct land route to Armenia and its exclusive facilitation of access between Nakhchivan and Baku. Iranian leaders believe that the Azerbaijani proposal, which places the Corridor along the current Iranian-Armenian border, poses an unacceptable risk of making Iran dependent on Azerbaijan for trade with and transit to Armenia.

Moreover, Iran views this proposal as a component of a bigger plot to destabilize Iran being carried out by Turkey and its NATO allies. Some Iranian analysts frame the Zangezur Corridor as “NATO’s Turani Cor­ridor”, designed to undercut Iran’s sov­ereignty and stability. Furthermore, Iran’s involvement in this crucial east-west transit route may be diminished if the Corridor becomes a part of the Middle Corridor of the Belt and Road Initiative, which is backed by Turkey.

Moscow also appears to endorse the open­ing of the Azerbaijan-Nakhchivan route via Armenia, aiming to ensure for itself a controlling function. The ceasefire agreement of 9 November 2020 stipulates that the Border Guard Service of the Rus­sian Federal Security service would be in charge of overseeing the route. Russia, having strategic and economic partnerships with Azerbaijan and Turkey, stands to gain from their regional cooperation; this is criti­cal as it grapples with Western sanctions following the invasion of Ukraine.

Iran, in turn, finds itself with limited options given its isolated position in the region. Tehran is particularly apprehensive to “geopolitical changes in the region” that could emanate from the establishment of the Zangezur Corridor. This is evident in the fact that Erdoğan identified Tehran, rather than Yerevan, as the primary impedi­ment to opening the Corridor.

From a wider angle, Tehran is more concerned about the idea that Erdoğan, buoyed by his recent electoral victory, is pursuing policies that Iran views as excessively ambitious, if not expansionist. For Iran, this extends beyond the South Caucasus and includes other areas where the two nations have conflicting interests, like Iraq and Syria. The possibility that Turkey’s post-election foreign policy might gravitate towards greater Western cooperation further intensifies Iran’s concerns.

Nonetheless, two prevailing factors are forcing Iran to employ a cautious approach to Turkish involvement in the South Cau­casus. Firstly, already facing sanctions, Iran relies heavily on economic collaboration with Turkey, thus making a direct conflict with Ankara untenable. Secondly, Russia’s apparent accommodation of Turkish inter­ests in the South Caucasus leaves Iran with­out substantial external backing in its oppo­si­tion to Ankara’s regional ambitions.

Israel’s rapidly flourishing political, eco­nomic, and military ties with Azerbaijan is also cause for concern when it comes to Iran’s position in the South Caucasus. In 2021, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (ISPI) revealed that Israel had exported weaponry to Azerbaijan in exchange for the continued sale of oil to Israel and the alleged sharing of Azerbaijani intelligence on Iran. Israeli weapons played a pivotal role in Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second Karabakh War.

This intensifying relationship is seen by Iran as part of a broader Israeli strategy to encircle and counteract Iranian influence. The Abraham Accords, which aimed at normalising relations between Israel and several Arab states, is another facet of this perceived strategy. In that sense, Iran views the strengthened Azerbaijan-Israel strategic partnership as a move to isolate Tehran in the South Caucasus and therefore also sees it as a threat to its national security and interests. After the September 2022 clashes along Armenia-Azerbaijan provisional bor­ders, Israel’s former Defence Minister Benny Gantz visited Azerbaijan, further solidifying their partnership. Iran subsequently per­formed military drills entitled “Conquerors of Khyber” along its border with Azerbaijan, an act that could be inter­preted as a direct signal to both Azerbaijan and Israel. Overall, the growing partnership between Israel and Azerbaijan has con­trib­uted to heightened tensions between Teh­ran and Baku, and this has been coupled with Iran’s own provocations directed at its northern neighbour – including its back­ing of anti-government militant factions in Azerbaijan.

Iran may adopt a more confrontational stance if these tensions get out of hand, particularly if there is a dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Zan­gezur. One plausible scenario could see Iran disregarding its previous restraint and offer­ing military support to Armenia. This would probably set off Turkey, Azerbaijan’s ally, and unintentionally drive Iran and Turkey toward conflict despite their aversion to one of these kinds.

Israel Prepares to Strike Back at Iran | CBN NewsWatch – April 15, 2024

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