Kurds in Turkey: A Comprehensive Guide

Kurds are the largest ethnic minority in Turkey. They comprise about 2018%%20of Turkey’s population, and the majority of Turkey’s E2%80%99 Kurdish population (roughly 2% million) resides in Istanbul. Additionally, some Kurds reside in other provinces in the nation’s east and southeast, in an area referred to as Turkey’s Kurdistan. Most Kurds are Sunni Muslim, but their communities also include Alevi Shi’a Muslim, Christian, Jewish, and Yezidi peoples. [1].

From 984 until 1083, the Marwanid dynasty (of Kurdish descent), headquartered in Diyarbakir, ruled over territory that included portions of Syria and Iraq. [2] The Ayyubid dynasty, also of Kurdish origin, ruled sections of Anatolia in the 12th and 13th centuries. [3].

Historian Rohat Alakom claims that the Modanlı tribe, which arrived in Haymana in 1184, was the first Kurdish tribe to settle in Central Anatolia. [4] The first Kurdish settlement in Central Anatolia was named Kürtler (“Kurds”), founded near modern-day Ankara in 1463. [5] Under Selim I’s rule, the Kurds were sent into exile to Central Anatolia for the first time (1512–20) [6].

Evliya Çelebi claimed that the Mahmudi, also known as “Pinyanişi,” were an Ottoman-Kurdish tribe in the Lake Van region with 60,000 warriors. [7] In 1643, their leader, Sarı Süleyman Bey, fortified and strengthened the Hoşap Castle in the Lake Van area. [8] After 1800, the Cihanbeyli, Reşwan, and Şêxbizin tribes moved into central Anatolia. [9] The total Kurdish population in Turkey was estimated at around 1. 5 million in the 1880s. [10].

The Treaty of Lausanne, which was negotiated during the Lausanne Conference in Lausanne, Switzerland, during 1922–1923 and signed on July 24, 1923, forced Kurds to join the Turkish state. After World War I broke out, the treaty’s goal was to resolve disagreements between the Ottoman Empire and other nations, such as the British Empire, the Allied French Republic, the Kingdom of Italy, the Empire of Japan, the Kingdom of Greece, and the Kingdom of Romania. [11] Turkey ratified the Lausanne Treaty on August 23, 1923, and all other signatories did the same by July 16, 1924. On the 6th of August 1924, the instruments of ratification were deposited in Paris. [12].

Kurdish populations lost their political autonomy when Turkey’s 1924 constitution was ratified following the Treaty of Lausanne. The Kurdish language was outlawed in public spaces by the 1924 constitution, and the terms “Kurd” and “Kurdistan” were also prohibited. In 1924 there was also a mandate which forbade Kurdish schools, organizations, and publications from serving their people. At this same period, a law permitting the expropriation of Kurdish landowners was in place, and Turkish-speaking people received their land. [13] These privations and receding autonomy was coupled with deadly massacres of the Kurdish people.

Many Kurdish tribes were ruled by chieftains (Agha) during the Ottoman era, and they continued to enjoy some degree of independence in their allotted lands until the fall of the empire. Feudal lords, tribal chieftains, and other powerful individuals who controlled the land and its inhabitants ruled over these regions. However, in the end, the Ottomans held total political power in the provinces, including Dersim. [14].

Some Kurdish and Zaza tribes were unhappy with some aspects of Atatürk’s “Kemalist policies” after the Republic of Turkey was established in 1923. This was especially the case since these policies enforced “Turkification,” which included, among other detrimental policies, land reform and the official extermination of the “Kurdish race” from Turkish Kurdistan. [15] It goes without saying that a lot of Kurds were angry at the way the Ottomans and the newly established Turkish government handled them. There were eleven distinct armed Kurdish uprisings in the Dersim province between 1876 and 1923, making it particularly difficult for the authorities to maintain control over. [16].

The provincial governors of Dersim filed complaints with Turkey’s central government in Ankara, citing the Aghas’ refusal to cede control of their manorial affairs, a type of land ownership, and their consequent nonpayment of taxes. The government wanted to control the nation’s agricultural resources and implement land reform, which included limiting production and planning it. Turkish leadership stated in a 1926 Interior Ministry report that they needed to use force to subdue the Aghas of Dersim. Remarkably, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk declared in a speech to the Turkish parliament on November 1, 1936, that Dersim is the nation’s most important internal issue. [18] “Turkification” was the proposed solution.

The Turkification process started with the 1934 Turkish Resettlement Law. This law included forced relocation of people within Turkey to develop cultural homogeneity. [19] The Tunceli Law, which applied the Resettlement Law to the Tunceli region—known as Dersim and largely inhabited by Kurdish people—was passed in 1935.

The Turkish Grand National Assembly passed Law No. 1164 on 25 June 1927, which allowed the state to establish Inspectorates-General. [20] This position was described as “a regional governorship whose authorities prevailed over the civilian, military, and judicial institutions under their domain but [who] had to comply with orders from Turkish President Mustafa Kemal.” [21]” The Fourth Inspectorate-General was created in January 1936, in the Dersim region. The Fourth Inspectorate-General was controlled by a “Governor Commander” within a military authority. He was bestowed with extensive power and was able to relocate residents of the Dersim area. 7.

Boys and girls in the Dersim region were ordered to attend boarding schools outside of Dersim by the Turkish Interior Minister, Sükrü Kaya. At them, they were intended to be Turkified and be married off to each other post-graduation. Because they were expected to pass on the principles of Turkification to their future offspring and had less interaction with the outside world than men, women were Turkified earlier than men. Established in the capital of the Inspectorate General, the Elazig Girls’ Institute was founded in September 1937 with the goal of turning Kurdish girls into Turkish women. [22].

When the Tunceli Law was passed, the Turkish military made observation posts in certain districts. In January 1937, a letter was written to the local governor in objection to the Tunceli law. The writers of the letter were arrested and executed. In May 1937, locals from Dersim ambushed a police convoy in response. [23] Shortly after, in order to establish an alliance, Seyid Riza, the chieftain of Yukarı Abbas Uşağı, brought his supporters to the Haydaran, Demenan, Yusufan, and Kureyşan tribes.

About 25,000 soldiers were dispatched in all to put an end to the Dersim uprising, and by summer, the military had finished its mission. The rebellion’s leaders, including leader Seyid Riza, were hanged, and Dersim was bombarded from the air while the rebel forces persisted in their resistance. In late 1938 Turkish forces quelled the resistance, which only ended when they ran out of ammunition.

Seyit Rıza was arrested as soon as he arrived at the government building in Erzincan Province for peace talks on September 10–12, 1937. The following day he was brought to the General Inspectorate headquarters at Elazığ, where he and a few of his comrades were hanged from November 15–18, 1937. [24].

Soon after the executions, Prime Minister Celal Bayar agreed to an attack on the Dersim rebels. This tragic attack started on January 2, 1938, and ended on August 7, 1938. [25].

Turkish planes flew sorties to attack the rebels. Sabiha Gökçen, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s adopted daughter and the first Turkish woman fighter pilot, was one of the pilots. Kurdish leader Nuri Dersimi claimed that the Turkish air force bombed the district with poisonous gas in 1938. [26].

According to the Fourth General Inspectorate, 11,818 people were sent into exile and 13,160 civilians were killed by the Turkish Army, effectively depopulating the province. [27] Nuri Dersimi reported that women and children were imprisoned in haysheds that were set on fire, burning them alive, and that many tribesmen were shot after they surrendered. [28] According to Professor Christian Gerlach, following the uprising, the Turkish army killed about 30,000 Kurds. [29].

About 3,000 people were forcibly deported from the Dersim region. [30] On May 4, 1938, the Turkish Cabinet decided to attack Nazimiye, Keçigezek Sin, and Karaoglan with Turkish military forces that had been gathered in the region beforehand. “This time, everyone in the region will be gathered and removed from the area; the gathering operation will strike the villages without prior notice and gather the individuals.” To do this, we will collect the people as well as the arms they have. At the moment, we are ready to deport 2,000 people. The goal of this action, which included orders to demolish their homes and deport the remaining Kurdish residents, was to kill them.

On October 5, 1927, ex-members of Kurdish nationalist groups and intellectuals who fled to Iraq, Iran, and Syria founded the Kurdish nationalist group Xoybûn in Greater Lebanon with help from former Dashnaktsutyun members. After Ihsan Nuri, a former Ottoman and Turkish army officer, was promoted to general (pasha) in 1927, Xoybûn sent him and his twenty companions to Erzurum. They founded a newspaper called Agirî and proclaimed the Republic of Ararat independent on October 8, 1927. Furthermore, in October 1927, Xoybûn nominated Ibrahim Heski, a chieftain of the Jalali tribe, to be the governor of the Agrî province in response to appeals to the League of Nations and the Great Powers. [32].

The Turkish government passed an amnesty bill on May 9, 1928. Kurdish nationalists were allowed to leave prison, and amnesty was promised to any oppositional Kurds who were willing to submit to the Kemalist government. [33] The Turkish government’s attempts to begin substantive discussions, however, were unsuccessful. As a result, the Turkish government chose to hold direct talks with Ihsan Nuri Pasha; however, this effort proved to be equally futile. [34].

President Mustafa Kemal presided over a cabinet meeting on December 29, 1929, which featured Fevzi Akkmak, the Chief of Staff, and Brahim Tali Ngören, the First Inspectorate-Inspector General’s General. In June, 1930 a government resolution was made to launch a military campaign against Mount Ararat. [35].

Along with the actual text of the cabinet decision, the General Staff of the Republic of Turkey sent an order to IX Corps on January 7, 1930, as follows: [36]

● Villages inhabited by Kurds between Bulakbaşı and Şıhlı Köyü and places of refuge will be occupied. And let rebels debar from livelihood bases.

● Once the district has been cleared of Kurds, proceed to the Ararat peak line and set up garrisons in the occupied areas.

● Only mobile gendarmerie forces will winter between 1930 and 1931. In the district, no residential areas, except needs for gendarmerie regiments, will not be left.

● Kurds who are denied access to food and housing will either be forced to flee to Iran or be distributed. In this case, the problem will be solved with Iran.

● The operation will begin in the last week of June 1930 and before the harvest season.

Temporary Halt of the Offensive Against Mount Ararat

Salih (Omurtak) was named IX Corps commander on March 18, 1930. [37] On June 11, 1930, the Turkish military began armed warfare against the Ararat insurrectionists. Xoybûn pleaded for assistance on behalf of Kurds throughout Kurdistan. On June 18, 1930, Hasan Nuri gave Îbrahîm Agha an attack order. [38] Turkish Captain Zühtü, an officer of the 2nd Mobile Gendarmerie Battalion in Idrı, received this order from a Kurdish rebel. The insurgents’ call for assistance was widely answered, and the Turks briefly halted their assault on Mount Ararat.

The Massacre Starts

Though Yusuf Mazhar, the special correspondent for the daily Cumhuriyet (Turkey’s most popular daily paper in the 1930s and 1940s), reported by telephone on July 12, 1930, that “the cleaning in districts of Erciş, Mount Süphan, and Zeylân was completely finished,” the massacre was widely believed to have occurred on July 13, 1930. ”[39] The Turkish army used two corps (VII Corps and IX Corps) and 80 aircraft for the operation. According to the daily Cumhuriyet of July 16, 1930, the Zilan River was inundated with dead bodies all the way to its mouth, resulting in over 15,000 recorded deaths. [40].

On July 15, 1930, Ibrahim Tali Öngören, the First Inspectorate-General’s general inspector, declared that the armed forces had destroyed everything with public support, that over a thousand militiamen had died, and that peasants who had supported the rebels had also been killed. [41] The Turkish “victory” at Ergish and Zilan, according to the British Foreign Office, was a minor one. Turkish forces defeated a small number of armed men and a sizable portion of those killed were non-combatants.

Witnesses

Salih, the first child of ükrü (Erol), the eldest son of the Bekiri tribe’s leader, and her spouse were purportedly killed, along with all of her other wives. She escaped the carnage concealed from gunfire behind their dead bodies. [42].

According to Mehmet Pamak’s grandfather, thousands of people—men, women, children, and the elderly—were slaughtered with machine guns, and the valley was covered in blood for several days. Pamak’s 80 year old great-grandmother and his infant aunt were both bayoneted to death. [43].

According to Kakil Erdem, one of the few surviving witnesses to the Zilan massacre, 35 of his relatives were killed, and soldiers sliced open the abdomen of a pregnant woman. Two of his brothers were beaten to death and three of his relatives were scalped in front of him.

In Turkish Media

The following morning, Cumhuriyet, a state-affiliated newspaper at the time, published an accurate report of the operation’s outcomes, saying, “The sweeping began.” All those in the Zilan Valley were exterminated, and none of them survived. ”[44].

Cultural Influences

When Musa Anter and three other friends from the Dicle Student Dormitory published a journal titled Dicle Kayna (Tigris Spring) in 1948, it was the first time he had heard about and discussed the Kurdish massacres, including the Zilan Massacre of 1930, the Dersim Massacre of 1938, and the Thirty-Three Bullets Massacre. [45].

One of Turkey’s most well-known writers, Yaşar Kemal, talked about his discovery of the Zilan Valley Massacre and how it affected him in an interview from the 1950s. [46] He wrote about massacres in his book Deniz Küstü (“The Sea-Crossed Fisherman”, 1978). The protagonist of the book, Selim Balkç, was hurt in the face during the Ararat battles and was treated at Cerrahpaşa Hospital in Istanbul. [47].

Censorship

Journalists Ercan Ksüz and Oktay Candemir conducted an interview with 94-year-old living eyewitness Kakil Erdem in 2007 for the Dicle News Agency. The interview was published under the title “Zilan Katliam’n Tan Konuştu” (Witness of Zilan Massacre Talks). The Van 2nd Criminal Court of First Instance found the journalists guilty of “inciting hate and enmity,” and each received an 18-month prison sentence in 2009. [48].

Issues Facing Kurds Today

Education

Turkish is the only language used to instruct pupils in the Turkish public education system; Kurdish is not allowed to be used as the primary language. [49] The Turkish Kurdish community has long pushed for Kurdish to be taught in public schools as a language and as a subject. Due to dire economic circumstances, a private Kurdish-language school experiment was abandoned in 2004. At the time of publication, several unrecognized private institutions are now offering instruction in Kurdish. [50] Despite the fact that learning in Kurdish was de facto permitted as of 2008, access to it was comparatively uncommon because of the extremely challenging requirements. If someone intended to establish and deliver educational opportunities in Kurdish, they frequently faced terrorism charges. Postsecondary education has also encountered obstacles: while universities are permitted to offer Kurdish as a subject, there aren’t many offerings. [51].

Assimilation

A number of administrations have viewed the declaration of Kurdish identity as a threat to Turkish unity because of the sizeable Kurdish population in Turkey. The state’s long-standing repression of the Kurdish language is one of the principal charges of forced cultural assimilation. Kurdish periodicals published in the 1960s and 1970s were shut down with a range of legal excuses. [52] Following Turkey’s military takeover in 1980, Kurdish was officially forbidden as a language of governance and administration. [53].

Congressman Bob Filner of the US highlighted the “alarming rate of disappearance of a way of life known as Kurdish culture,” calling it a “cultural genocide.” [54] Mark Levene asserts that assimilation techniques went beyond mere cultural absorption and that the late nineteenth-century events continued to be felt until 1990. [55].

Turkey carried out a genocide campaign against Kurds with the goal of assimilating them, according to Desmond Fernandes and Tove Skutnabb-Kangas citing paragraphs 2(a) and 2(e) of the UN Genocidal Convention. [56] Due to both internal and external factors,no major nation officially recognize the “genocide” designation. Senior lecturer at De Montfort University Desmond Fernandes divides the Turkish government’s strategy into the following groups:

● Forced assimilation, which included the prohibition of the Kurdish language and the expulsion of Kurds to areas of Turkey where the Kurdish population was not the majority

● The prohibition of any groups that are hostile to category one.

● Brutal suppression of Kurdish opposition.

Cultural Expression

From 1983 to 1991, it was forbidden to publish, broadcast, or engage in any kind of publicity, publication, or publication in any language other than Turkish, unless that language was the primary official language of a country with which Turkey had diplomatic relations. [57] Despite the fact that all languages were subject to this restriction legally, Kurdish was most affected because it is the primary official language of no country but is widely spoken in the Kurdistan region. [58] The ministry ruled that offering information about municipal services, such as culture, art, environment, city cleanliness, and health, in languages other than Turkish is unconstitutional. [59].

June 2004 saw the debut of a half-hour Kurdish show on Turkey’s public television network TRT. On March 8, 2006, the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) authorized two TV stations (Gün TV and Söz TV) and one radio channel (Medya FM) to use the Kurdish language with restrictions. [60] This law was implemented in 2006 in an attempt to fulfill one of the requirements that the European Union had specified during its talks with Turkey about joining the EU. The new rule will allocate four hours of television and five hours of radio programming per week. [61] The Turkish public broadcaster TRT launched TRT Kurdî, the first channel that is exclusively in the Kurdish language, in January 2009. [62].

Even with these advancements, the use of Kurdish in public and government organizations was still restricted until a few years ago. On June 14, the Interior Ministry removed Abdullah Demirbaş from his role as elected mayor of Diyarbakr’s Sur district, and several elected members of the city council were also dismissed. The high court agreed with the ministry’s judgment.

The ministry’s position remained unchanged, despite the fact that, as per the aforementioned municipality, 27.22% of district residents regularly consume Kurdish food. In another case, the Diyarbakr mayor, Osman Baydemir, underwent a comparable series of interrogations and court proceedings. He faced charges because the municipality’s new year greeting cards used the Kurdish phrase Sersala We Pîroz Be (Happy New Year). The prosecutor stated in her letter, “It was found that the suspect used the Kurdish phrase ‘Sersala We Piroz Be’ (Happy New Year) in the celebration card. I demand that he be punished in accordance with Article 222/1 of the Turkish Penal Code on behalf of the general public. ”[63].

The Municipality’s official website is now available in three languages: Turkish, Kurdish, and English.[64]

The HDP

Background

The Democratic Party of the Peoples, sometimes referred to as the Peoples’ Democratic Party, is a pro-minority political organization in Turkey. It is called Halkların Demokratik Partisi, or Partiya Demokratîk a Gelan in Kurdish. The party, which leans left-wing in general, strongly supports feminism, LGBT rights, minority rights, youth rights, and equality. It is an associate member of the Party of European Socialists, a consultative member of the Socialist International, and a party within the Progressive Alliance. [65].

The Democratic Party of the Philippines (HDP) was founded in 2020 as the political branch of the People’s Party (PEP) and was a confederation of various left-wing parties that had previously fielded candidates as Independents in order to overcome the 2010 election threshold. The HDP wants to completely upend the existing Turkish-Kurdish divide and other accepted boundaries in Turkish politics. The Democratic Regions Party (DBP), also known as the HDP’s sibling party, and the HDP are allies. From 2013 to 2015, DBP politicians participated in peace negotiations between the Turkish government and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

The leadership of the party is co-presidential, with a chairman and a chairwoman. [66] The party’s nominee for president in 2014 was Selahattin Demirtas, who received 9. 77% of the vote. The political party made the decision to run party lists in the upcoming June 2015 general election instead of independent candidates, citing concerns that the poll would not reach the 2010 threshold. It polled at 13. 12%, exceeding expectations, and moving up to third place among legislative groups. August 28, 2015, AKP Prime Minister Ahmet Davutolu formed an interim electoral cabinet, in which Ali Haydar Konca, an HDP MP, was named Minister of European Union Affairs and Müslüm Doan, a minister of development. Thanks to a co-mayorship held by a man and a woman, the party is in charge of the municipalities in which they won the elections. [67].

Following the unsuccessful coup attempt in Turkey in 2016, the HDP angrily denounced the coup and emphasized the military authorities’ prior repression of democratic forces. As a result, suspected members of the Gülen movement were the focus of Turkish purges, and the HDP was initially ignored and left out of the post-coup national reconciliation process. Eventually, however, the Turkish judiciary began accusing elected HDP members of supporting terrorism. The HDP’s co-chairs, Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekda, were among the lawmakers imprisoned in November 2016, which severely hindered the party’s ability to engage in politics and communicate. [68].

In December 2020, Salim Kaplan, the HDP’s co-deputy chairman for local governments, declared that 48 towns had been taken over and taken over by the government as part of a crackdown, adding that “since 2016, 20,000 of our members have been taken into detention and more than 10,000 of our members and executives have been sent to jail.” [69] Up until the issue was dropped in March 2021, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) charged the HDP of being closely associated with the PKK and that its activities were terroristic. [70].

How the HDP Became King-Makers

The AKP risks losing the support of conservative Kurds because of its sharp shift to hard-line nationalism. Now resentful Kurds are emerging as key players in the Turkish elections. Kurdish voters became kingmakers in the crucial legislative and presidential polls. In light of this, opposition parties are searching for ways to work together in order to overthrow Erdogan and preserve Turkish democracy.

Erdogan and former Kurdish AKP supporters, according to Kadir Atalay, owner of PIAR polling, no longer back the party. According to Atalay, Kurds supported Erdogan primarily because they believed he would resolve the Kurdish issue. But after his sudden turn to nationalism, they are “deceived and abandoned. AKP’s alliance with the far-right Nationalist Action Party (MHP) is one example of this in particular. Other examples include the Turkish offensive on the predominantly Kurdish city of Afrin in Syria, Ankara’s threats against Iraqi Kurds over their bid for independence last year (2021), and the crackdown on Kurdish militants in 2015–2016 that destroyed towns and neighborhoods.

Atalay’s findings company found that dissuading Kurdish supporters have cost the AKP about 4 points of its vote. Atalay claims, “Our surveys on the AKP losses indicate that the party has lost 4 points through Kurdish voters who support the peace process and oppose the environment of conflict.” ”[72].

Abdullatif Sener asserts that “[this] is the only method to steal away the Kurds who have supported Erdogan and the AKP.” ” Abdullatif Sener is a former deputy premier who has also had issues with Erdogan. He advised opposition parties to work together.

The Opposition and the Kurdish Cause

The Republican People’s Party (CHP) is a Kemalist and social-democratic political party in Turkey.[73] It is also the oldest political party in the country, founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the first president and founder of the modern Turkish Republic. The party is also cited as the founding party of modern Turkey.[74] The CHP describes itself as a ”modern social-democratic party, which is faithful to the founding principles and values of the Republic of Turkey.”[75] It is the main opposition party to the ruling conservative Justice and Development Party in the Grand National Assembly with 135 MPs.

Since 2002, Turkish politics have followed a set formula: the nation regularly holds elections, with the Justice and Development Party, led by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, emerging victorious. The most recent municipal elections, held on March 31, 2019, and the rerun election in Istanbul, held on June 23, were the exceptions to this rule. Almost all of Turkey’s major cities, including Istanbul and Ankara, were won by the opposition, delivering the AKP its worst electoral defeat to date.

It will be challenging for the opposition, particularly the CHP, to manage its recent electoral victories and keep the coalition behind it. The official opposition alliance is composed of the secularist CHP and the nationalist Good Party (İyi Party). However, the pro-Kurdish HDP and the minor Islamist Felicity (Saadet) Party also identify as part of the opposition and frequently form caucuses with CHP.

Since the CHP is the dominant party within the opposition group, it must find a way to both prevent the disintegration of the group and satisfy the political demands of the pro-Kurdish HDP. The CHP has a challenging task to preserve political momentum following the municipal elections.

From a political standpoint, the most obvious sign that the opposition CHP is heading toward more change could be a change in how it views the Kurdish issue. With the exception of a brief time (the late 1980s and early 1990s) when the CHP’s predecessor, the Social Democratic People’s Party (SHP), tried to advance a political solution to the Kurdish issue in opposition to the then-dominant military approach, the CHP has largely upheld the status quo and statist positions on the subject. [76].

The CHP, however, has hinted at a change in stance. For example, the CHP fiercely condemned the government’s move to remove the three Kurdish mayors of southeast and eastern Turkish cities, citing politically motivated and baseless charges. The party referred to it as an illegal political takeover. Ekrem Mamolu, the newly elected CHP mayor of Istanbul, went to Diyarbakir to support the Kurdish mayors. Furthermore, he recently declared that, provided there is sufficient interest from teachers and students, Kurdish language classes will be added to the ISMEK (Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Art and Vocational Training Courses) program. Furthermore, there have been speculations that the CHP is preparing to offer its own solution to the Kurdish issue. Together, these actions point to a significant shift in Kurdish policy. The CHP is obviously not in power, so its new strategy won’t have an immediate impact on policy. However, if maintained, this new policy direction might be beneficial and significant for a number of reasons. [77].

If the CHP takes up and upholds a reformist political stance on the Kurdish question, it might sow the seeds of historical reconciliation between the prevailing ideology and its main victim. It’s crucial to keep in mind that, despite the initial positive signs, it is still too early and undeveloped to assume that the CHP will take this course of action.

The CHP is in a difficult situation regarding the Kurdish question. The Good Party could ultimately lose if Kurdish demands are met. On the other hand, the CHP’s oversensitivity to the Good Party’s concerns is likely to annoy, if not agitate, the Kurds. Trying to “get by” isn’t a viable long-term policy strategy.

It can and should try to change the political agenda that is dominated by Kurdish issues. At this point, what can the opposition, and especially the CHP, do except formulate a clear policy in favor of the rights of the Kurdish language, oppose the anti-Kurdish regional policy, and support the political agency of the HDP? Regretfully, it will be challenging to move the agenda in favor of constructive conversation given Turkish incursions into Syria and other nations’ reactions to the operation. The CHP must – at the very least – present some fresh ideas. Prior to a recent municipal election, the opposition bloc set the agenda, putting the ruling coalition on the defensive. The opposition lost this aggressive impetus following the election. Once more, it appears like the government is dictating Turkish politics while the opposition tries to catch up. [78].

The CHP must emphasize new issues for the opposition to continue to be relevant. Such political initiatives will force the AKP to remain reactive rather than setting the agenda and keep the public aware of the shortcomings and vulnerabilities of the government.

Conclusion

The background of Kurdish history and issues in Turkey, accounts of a few significant Kurdish uprisings, and concerns about politics, assimilation, education, and cultural expression within the Kurdish community were all covered in this paper.

The Kurdish community in Turkey still faces discrimination from secular and religious parties like the CHP and AKP. Turkey must be able to approach the tensions and issues facing its Kurds realistically. To do this, the CHP and HDP must collaborate in order to bring the nation together and create a more prosperous and strong nation for all.

[1]https://rpl.hds.harvard.edu/faq/kurds-turkey

[2]Gunter 2018, p. 226.

[4]Cevdet Türkay, Başbakanlık Arşiv Belgelerine Göre Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Oymak, Aşiret ve Cemaatler, Tercüman Yayınları, 1979, p. 502.

[5]Ahmet Nezili Turan, Yaninâbâd Tarihini Ararken, Kızılcahamam Belediye Yayınları, 1999.

The Kurdish tribes of the Ottoman Empire were written about by Mark Sykes in The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, Volume XXXVIII, 1908.

[7]Evliya Çelebi; Robert Dankoff (1 January 1991). Melek Ahmed Pasha (1588–1662), an Ottoman statesman, as portrayed in Evliya Celebi’s Book of Travels (Seyahat-name) SUNY Press. pp. 150–. ISBN 978-0-7914-0640-3.

[8]Altan Çilingiroğlu (1988). The History of the Kingdom of Van, Urartu. Ofis Ticaret Matbaacilik Limited. p. 54. ISBN 9789759551506.

[9]Jak Yakar (2000). Ethnoarchaeology of Anatolia: rural socio-economy in the Bronze and Iron Ages. Emery and Claire Yass Publications in Archaeology. ISBN 9789652660114.

[10]Karl Kaser (2008). Patriarchy After Patriarchy: Gender Relations in Turkey and in the Balkans, 1500-2000. LIT Verlag Münster. p. 98. ISBN 978-3-8258-1119-8.

[11]https://www.britannica.com/event/Treaty-of-Lausanne-1923

[12]Martin Lawrence (1924). Treaties of Peace, 1919–1923. Vol. I. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. p. lxxvii.

[13]Olson, Robert (1989). The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880–1925. University of Texas Press. p. 91.

[14] Faik Bulut, (government perspective on Kurdish rebellions in Turkey), Devletin Gözüyle Türkiye’de Kürt İsyanlar, Yön Yayınclık, 1991, 214–215

[15]Ashly, Jaclynn (13 January 2021). “The Massacre in Dersim Still Haunts Kurds in Turkey”. Fondation-Institut kurde de Paris.

[16]McDowall, David (2007). A Modern History of the Kurds. London: Tauris & Co.

[17]Beşikçi, Ismail. (1990) Dersim Jenosidi ve Tunceli Kanunu (1935) (The 1935 law concerning Dersim’s genocide and Tunceli) Bonn, p. 29.

[18]Hasretyan, M. A. (1995) Türkiye’de Kürt Sorunu (1918-1940), Berlin, Wêşanên, ënstîtuya Kurdî: I.,p.262

[19]Çağaptay, Soner (2002). “Reconfiguring the Turkish nation in the 1930s” (PDF). Harvard. Retrieved 2 August 2010.

[20]Bayir, Derya (22 April 2016). Minorities and Nationalism in Turkish Law. Routledge. p. 139. ISBN 978-1-317-09579-8.

[21]Hamit Bozarslan, “Emergency of Kurdish Nationalism and struggle in the late Ottoman Empire”, The Cambridge history of Turkey: Turkey in the modern world, Cambridge University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-521-62096-3, p. 342.

[23]Jwaideh, Wadie (2006). The Kurdish National Movement: Its Origins and Development. Syracuse University Press. p. 215.

[24]Van Bruinessen, Martin (1994). Andreopoulos, George J. (ed. ). Conceptual and historical dimensions of genocide. University of Pennsylvania Press. pp. 141–170.

[26]Reşat Hallı, Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Ayaklanmalar (1924–1938), T. C. Genelkurmay Baskanlığı Harp Tarihi Dairesi, 1972, p. 382.

[27]“Resmi raporlarda Dersim katliamı: 13 bin kişi öldürüldü”, Radikal, November 19, 2009.

[28]“The Suppression of the Dersim Rebellion in Turkey (1937-38) Page 4” (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 21 May 2013.

[29]Gerlach, Christian (2016). The Extermination of the European Jews. Cambridge University Press. p. 401. ISBN 978-0-521-88078-7

[30]Lundgren, Asa (2007). The unwelcome neighbour: Turkey’s Kurdish policy. London: Tauris & Co. p. 44. ​​

[31]Primitive Rebels Or Revolutionary Modernizers: The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in Turkey. Zed Books. p. 82. ISBN 978-1-85649-822-7.

[32]Mehmet Köçer, “Ağrı İsyanı (1926–1930)”, Fırat Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, Cilt: 14, Sayı: 2, s. 385. Archived September 2, 2011

[33] Paul J. White, Primitive rebels or revolutionary modernizers?: the Kurdish national movement in Turkey, Zed Books, 2000, ISBN 978-1-85649-822-7, p. 78.

[34]Wadie Jwaideh, The Kurdish national movement: its origins and development, Syracuse University Press, 2006, ISBN 978-0-8156-3093-7, p. 212.

[35]Faik Bulut, Devletin Gözüyle Türkye’de Kürt İsyanları, Yön Yayınları, 1991, p. 190.

[37]T. C. Basımevi, Ankara, 1972; Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı Yayınları, Türk İstiklâl Harbine Katılan Tümen ve Daha Üst Kademelerdeki Komutanların Biyografileri; 232.

[38]Emin Karaca, Ağır Eteklerinde İsyan: Bir Kürt Ayaklanmasının Anatomisi, 3. Baskı, Karakutu Yayınları, pp. 153-155.

[39]Yusuf Mazhar, Cumhuriyet, 13 Temmuz 1930, “Temizlik başladı: Zeylân deresindekiler tamamen imha edildi. Bunlardan tek bir kişi kurtulmamıştır. Ağrı’da harekât devam ediyor. ” Ankara 12 (Telefonla) — Son malûmata göre Erciş, Süphan dağı ve Zeylân havalisinde temizlik tamamen bitmiş…. (in Turkish), Also see Yönetim Zamandizini 1930 yılı, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İdare Tarihi Araştırması (TİDATA), Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Kamu Yönetimi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi: 2, Ankara, 2007, p. 180 (78th page of Pdf file) 12 Temmuz’da Zeylan deresi civarındaki eşkıya imha edildi.

[40]Yusuf Mazhar, Cumhuriyet, 16 Temmuz 1930, … Zilan harekatında imha edilenlerin sayısı 15. 000 kadardır. Zilan Deresi ağzına kadar ceset dolmuştur….

[41]Vakit, July 15, 1930

[42] “Akbük’ün Kürt ninesi,” Nevzat Çağlar Tüfekçi, Radikal, October 26, 2008 (title of event: “Zilan Deresi Kıyımı”), retrieved September 9, 2010

[43]Christopher Houston, Islam, Kurds and the Turkish nation state, Berg Publishers, 2001, ISBN 978-1-85973-477-3, p. 102.

[44]“Temezilik başladi zeylân deresindekiler tamamen imha edildi”. Cumhuriyet. July 13, 1930

[45]Ahmet Alış, Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History, Bosphorus University, “The Process of the Politicization of the Kurdish Identity in Turkey: The Kurds and the Turkish Labor Party (1961–1971)”, p. 73.

[46]Cengiz Çandar, “”Kürt açılımı”nı Ararat-Süphan ekseninde izlerken…”, Radikal, July 31, 2009.

[47]Yashar Kemal, ibid, pp. 57, 58, 149 etc.

[48]Freedom of the Press, Freedom of the Press 2010 Draft Report, p. 2.

[49]Turkey 2006 Progress Report” (PDF). European Commission. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2016-03-04.

[50]“Kürtçe okulda Kürtçe karne”. Al Jazeera Turk – Ortadoğu, Kafkasya, Balkanlar, Türkiye ve çevresindeki bölgeden son dakika haberleri ve analizler.

[51]Skutnabb-Kangas, Tove; Fernandes, Desmond (2008). “A Comparison of Kurdish Educational Language Policy in Two Situations of Occupation: Kurds in Turkey and in (Iraqi) Kurdistan” Genocide Studies and Prevention. 3 (1): 45–46.

[52]Helen Chapin Metz, ed. Kurds, Turkey: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1995.

[53]Toumani, Meline. “Minority Rules”. The New York Times, 17 February 2008

[54]Meho, Lokman I (2004). “Congressional Record”. The Kurdish Question in U. S. Foreign Policy: A Documentary Sourcebook. Praeger/Greenwood. p. 400.

[55]Levene, Mark (1998). “Creating a Modern ‘Zone of Genocide’: The Impact of Nation- and State-Formation on Eastern Anatolia, 1878–1923”. Holocaust and Genocide Studies. 12 (3): 393–433.

[56]Skutnabb-Kangas, Tove; Fernandes, Desmond (April 2008). “A Comparative Analysis of the Kurdish Educational Language Policy in Two Occupation Situations: Kurds in Turkey and in (Iraqi) Kurdistan” Genocide Studies and Prevention. 3: 43–73.

[57]Institut Kurde de Paris

[58]“Kürtçe yabancı dil mi?”. Evrensel. 2003-04-15. Archived from the original on 2007-09-27.

[59]“Duty Telephone Service”. Diyarbakir Buyuksehir Municipality Software and Programming Branch Office. Archived from the original on 2014-08-31.

[60]“Kurdish broadcast ends Turkish TV taboo”. ABC News Online. 2004-06-10.

[61]“Yerel kanallarda Kürtçe Mart’ta”. NTV-MSNBC.. 2006-02-21.

[62]“TRT’nin Kürtçe kanalı TRT 6 yayına başladı”. Hürriyet.

[64]“Duty Telephone Service”. Diyarbakir Buyuksehir Municipality Software and Programming Branch Office. Archived from the original on 2014-08-31.

[65]For Progressive Alliance, see: “Parties & Organisations”. Progressive Alliance. For Socialist International membership, see: “Members”. Socialist International. For European counterparts and interaction, see: “Parties Map”. PES.

[66]van Wilgenburg, Wladimir (23 February 2020). “Turkey’s pro-Kurdish party elects co-chairs amid continued state crackdown”. Kurdistan24.

[67]“Men and Women to Run Together 58 HDP Municipalities”. Bianet. 1 April 2019.

[68]“HDP’s Hakkari MP Akdoğan Arrested”. Bianet. 8 November 2016.

[69]“20,000 HDP members taken into custody in 4 years, 10,000 jailed”. 25 December 2020.

[70]“Pro-Kurdish HDP equivalent to outlawed terrorist PKK, says Erdoğan”. Ahval.

[71]https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2018/04/turkey-elections-kurds-emerge-as-kingmakers.html

[73]“History of the CHP”. www.chp.org.tr

[74] See: Footnote 13

[75]Ciddi, Sinan (2009). Kemalism in Turkish Politics: The Republican People’s Party, Secularism and Nationalism. Taylor & Francis.

[76]https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/10/17/can-the-turkish-opposition-develop-a-sustainable-kurdish-policy/

[77]https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/10/17/can-the-turkish-opposition-develop-a-sustainable-kurdish-policy/

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