Is Turkey Close to Syria? A Comprehensive Look at the Geopolitical Landscape

The two countries are currently moving toward rapprochement, marking the end of a lengthy and difficult process that could completely change Syria’s northern border region. A critical summit involving the defense ministers of Russia, Turkey, and Syria as well as their corresponding security chiefs was held in Moscow in December 2022, marking the beginning of the rapprochement process. The foreign ministers convened for the most recent meeting on May 10, 2023, and Iran was present as it had joined the group subsequent to the initial meeting. The parties have decided to carry on with the negotiations at the deputy or assistant foreign minister level in an effort to develop a “road map” that would eventually result in the normalization of relations between Syria and Turkey.

First off, even though this process is important, it won’t result in a comprehensive deal or treaty, nor will it bring about a fair political transition in Syria. Instead, the process of normalization may give birth to a security framework that lays out fundamental ideas and specifies how Syria and Turkey will handle different security, economic, and demographic issues along their shared border. Russia and Iran would likely be the guarantors of such a deal.

Second, if the two countries achieve normalization, it would necessarily alter the status quo in northern Syria. How exactly that would unfold and in what speed is difficult to predict. However, the report’s early indicators point to potential changes in the population, adjustments to the territorial control map, reallocation of economic resources, and security cooperation between Turkey and Syria on a number of issues.

There is also a possibility that the Syria-Turkey talks could stall. One issue is that there are enduring disagreements between Ankara and Damascus that might not be resolved. But another possible problem is that the issues at stake are very complex, multilayered, and internationalized. Parties to the process may therefore choose for unilateral, piecemeal fixes as opposed to a framework that would pave the way for a more thorough resolution.

But a piecemeal approach is unlikely to make much of a difference to the current situation, which neither Turkey nor Syria’s central authorities find satisfactory. A profound change will necessarily require understanding and cooperation between Turkey and Syria, backed by Iran and Russia. Russia’s efforts to undermine Western interests in Syria, its role as a mediator, and its goal of achieving a diplomatic win by mending ties between Syria and Turkey all contribute to the likelihood of a deal.

This report explores the rapprochement process largely from the perspective of Syrian central authorities in Damascus. The main causes that forced President Bashar al-Assad to hold direct negotiations with Turkey, the most ardent of his opponents’ foreign backers, are described in the first section. The second section outlines the parameters of a prospective deal. The report addresses important issues like the question of Turkey’s military withdrawal, economic cooperation, the return of refugees, and security cooperation against the northeastern autonomous Kurdish entity. The majority of the government official interviews that were done for this report were given to the authors under the condition of anonymity because they included sensitive topics that the interviewees were not authorized to discuss in public.

The Ukraine War Weakens Russia

Between 2016 and 2018, following the Russian intervention in Syria, the Syrian government experienced a resurgence. With the assistance of Russia’s military, it managed to reclaim pockets of opposition-controlled territory throughout Syria after rebels’ foreign supporters halted aid. By the end of 2018, shortly after the southern Dera’a governorate was recaptured, the focal point of the Syrian conflict shifted to the Turkish border. The presence of Turkish forces in the northwest and U.S. forces in the northeast prevented the government from capturing these areas through military means. Consequently, a process of bartering and bargaining began, primarily between Turkey and Russia, with intermittent interruptions due to military escalations, most notably Russian-backed government advancements and Turkish incursions.

The Ukraine war disrupted Russia’s dominant position in Syria in every way. Politically, the West no longer relied on Russia for its Syrian file. Russia’s relationship with the United States in the Syrian context reached a nadir after the invasion of Ukraine, even though Moscow had started with a relatively good working relationship with the Biden administration when it came into office in 2021. Russia’s weakness was an opportunity for Iran to expand its presence within Syria and for Israel to exploit Russia’s distraction by ramping up its airstrikes, all of which undermined Russia’s role as a third party working to mitigate potential escalation between Israel and Iran in Syria. Concurrently, as Russia’s prospects in Ukraine took a turn for the worse in spring 2022, Moscow initiated the withdrawal of experienced personnel from Syria through regular rotations, and even withdrew its modern battle tanks, diminishing its combat capabilities in the region.

The Ukrainian conflict also weakened Russia’s ability to assist the government in recapturing territory or exerting pressure on Turkey for negotiations. Russia was now partly dependent on Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan in its war against the West. Previously, Russia had supported the Syrian government in offensives during 2017–18 and 2019–20, resulting in territorial gains against rebel groups in northwestern Syria and occasional direct confrontations between Russian and Turkish forces, and between the Syrian Army and Turkish forces. However, following the Ukrainian war, not only was Russia unable to escalate hostilities on the Idlib front, but it also preferred to maintain a relatively calm front line and resort to diplomacy. This message was conveyed to the Syrian leadership by Russia, as a senior Syrian military official confirmed to the authors. In essence, Russia found itself incapable and unwilling to assist the government in regaining territory—but rather more keen on reconciling Damascus with Ankara.

The war in Ukraine presented an opportunity for Iran to expand its presence in Syria, albeit at the expense of the Syrian government, rather than the government’s adversaries. If there had been a degree of restraint that Russia imposed on Iranian activities, that was now diminished. Iran expanded its influence, driven by its own interests and potentially encouraged by Russia—as a means to spook Israel and the West. (Both Israel and the West opposed Iranian entrenchment in Syria and partly relied on Russia to limit such entrenchment.) Against the backdrop of Russia’s declining influence and Iran’s growing clout, Assad flew to Tehran in May 2022 to secure support for his government.

Assad reportedly sought to obtain Tehran’s support for what the Syrian government has referred to as “popular resistance”—armed pro-government local forces, including Arab clans. The aim of Assad’s gambit was to undermine the dominance of the United States and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the northeast. However, a senior Syrian military officer said that Assad was informed that Iran “didn’t want to tilt the balance of power in northeast Syria” and that Tehran refused to support “popular resistance in Deir al-Zour” in order to “shake the stability of American presence in the area.” Assad also sought a new, more favorable credit line from Iran—the previous line of credit had ended two months earlier—but all he could get was an extension of the old line. Meanwhile, Tehran renewed its demands that Syria open its markets for Iranian goods.

But Iran then became more interested in destabilizing the U.S. presence in Syria’s northeast toward the end of 2022. This change in position wasn’t a response to Damascus’s wish to start a “popular resistance.” Rather, Tehran changed because of other considerations related primarily to the U.S.-Iranian relationship. In mid-2022, the hopes of reaching a nuclear deal between the United States and Iran waned, while the relationship between Russia and Iran strengthened. A strong indication of that strengthening was Tehran’s agreement to supply much-needed drones to Russia starting in August 2022—in defiance of Western demands. Classified U.S. documents that were leaked in April 2023 indicate that Iran’s position shifted toward the end of 2022, and Russia, Iran, and the Syrian government increased their cooperation with the goal of destabilizing the U.S. presence in the northeast. Iran’s increasingly aggressive behavior in northeast Syria in the beginning of 2023 might have been the product of these shifts.

There is another more recent indication that Iran’s calculations in northeastern Syria are a response to the United States rather than Damascus. Recent reports describe a potential deal that involves the nuclear issue, U.S. prisoners held in Iran, releasing frozen Iranian assets, and—interestingly—halting Iranian-sponsored attacks in Syria’s northeast. This motivation for Iranian action means that upending the status quo in the northeast (or not), where pro-Iranian proxies have strong presence, is merely a bargaining chip for Tehran in its dealings with the United States. In contrast, Turkey’s dismantling of the Kurdish administration in northeastern Syria and ousting the United States is a national security priority.

Section II: The View from Damascus

It is challenging to try to envision what has been happening during the Moscow negotiations between Syria and Turkey, given all the variables that could affect the structure of a possible agreement. In this section, we make an effort to examine what Damascus would probably accept, taking into account its current priorities and the post-conflict realities for all parties. There are many unknowns or flexible factors in the ongoing negotiations, but one thing seems certain: Assad would only restore ties with Ankara if he could secure a significant agreement that guaranteed Turkey’s eventual (not immediate) withdrawal from Syria, gains in the economy, and security cooperation against the Kurdish forces in the northeast and the armed opposition in the northwest. Settling for something less would only legitimize Turkey’s presence. In contrast, a no-deal scenario—which is still conceivable—would require waiting, which is Syria’s usual negotiating strategy. It is highly probable that the Syrian government would consent to an indefinite interregnum if all of its demands were fulfilled.

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