Because of their close bonds and shared interests, Israel and Turkey’s relations have persevered despite the verbal spat that followed the Gaza war between Ankara and Tel Aviv.
Just as Turkey’s reaction to the invasion of Ukraine startled observers with its legalism and insistence on upholding Kiev’s sovereignty, so too did its initial cautious stance towards the commencement of Israel’s war on Gaza. Ankara, which maintains strong and stable ties with the two aggressor nations, has freely offered to mediate in both cases, just as it has in the past. In both cases too, the ambivalence detectable in that offer is not merely due to the conjuncture. It also captures the essence of that country’s diplomacy, which has often had to pull off risky balancing acts throughout its history.
After more than a decade of strained relations that periodically threatened divorce before experiencing protracted periods of reconciliation, Turkey and Israel were in the midst of a reconciliation process when Hamas launched its surprise attack on October 7, 2023. The capacity to manage this volatility is the first source of surprise. It is due to multiple convergences, political, strategic and above all economic. What is the future of this complicated relationship in light of the new circumstances brought about by the Israel-Palestine conflict returning to the Middle East’s forefront?
There is a long history of mutual understanding and cooperation between the two countries because Turkey was the first Muslim country to recognize Israel in 1949, shortly after the Hebrew State declared its independence. Other than a few minor clashes during the cold war brought on by the Israeli-Arab truces, their mutual relations have been incredibly positive since the end of the bipolar world. Additionally, it doesn’t appear that the “entente cordiale” was questioned during the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) rise to power at the turn of the century. Even in 2008, Ankara hosted unofficial talks aimed at easing the Syrian regime’s normalization of relations with Israel, but the talks eventually broke down.
The Turko-Israeli conflict began in 2009, but it was less about the Palestinian question and more about the new circumstances brought about by Hamas’s rise to power in the Gaza Strip after the 2006 elections. When Israel launched its first round of heavy bombings on the Palestinian enclave, dubbed “Operation Cast lead,” Ankara reacted swiftly. “In a memorable panel discussion at the January 2009 Davos economic forum, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan chastised Israeli President Shimon Pérès harshly.”
Subsequently, it seemed that the recently elected Turkish government was attempting to draw closer to Hamas in order to include it as a formal participant in the negotiations. Turkish-Israeli relations were on the verge of total collapse a year later when the Mavi Marmara, the flagship of a humanitarian flotilla led by a Turkish Islamic organization, attempted to impose the Gaza blockade. Nine Turkish humanitarian workers were killed when the ship was intercepted, and it appeared that the two countries’ relationship would never mend.
But in 2013, in a completely unprecedented step to repair their relationship, Benyamin Netanyahu agreed to offer Erdoğan the apology he was demanding. The 2014 “Protective Edge” airstrikes on Gaza were criticized by Hoover, the leader of the AKP, who said that Israel had “outdone Hitler in barbarity,” endangering the project. Because of this, it took until 2016 to establish high-level diplomatic relations and exchange ambassadors after compensation was given to the families of those slain in the humanitarian flotilla. But the truce would not last long.
The Great March of Return by the Gazans in 2019 was brutally suppressed, resulting in numerous Palestinian casualties. This led to a renewed verbal spat between the Israeli Prime Minister and the Turkish President. The two countries did not exchange ambassadors again until 2022, during a visit to Turkey by Israeli President Isaac Herzog, due to another downturn in diplomatic relations. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates were among the Arab nations with whom Ankara was trying to mend fences at the time; the latter appeared to be beginning a phase of international convergence with Israel as a result of the Abraham accords.
More than its irregularities, this ongoing argument now stands out for its tenacity, which in the end preserved the relationship between the two main characters. Because the imprisonment of a humanitarian ship, the increasingly severe and frequent airstrikes against Gaza, the heated verbal sparring between leaders, or the violent suppression of Palestinian protests did not improve the already precarious ties between those two regional powers
The 2018 Nation State Law in Israel and the 2020 conversion of Hagia Sophia into a mosque in Turkey have ignited discussions about the potent forces of national identity and religious nationalism. In this thought-provoking piece, Professor Jocelyne Cesari delves into the complexities of religious nationalism in both countries, challenging the common perception of it as a mere political tool
Comparing the Uncomparable: Turkey and Israel
While comparing Israel to Muslim-majority nations is often considered taboo, Cesari argues that such comparisons offer valuable insights. By examining these two seemingly disparate cases, we can uncover the often-overlooked process of adapting religious traditions to modern national communities. More importantly, comparing Turkey and Israel allows us to shift the focus from individual beliefs to the community level, where religious nationalism truly takes root.
Beyond Ideology: Nationalism as a Collective Identity
Cesari emphasizes that nationalism transcends mere ideology. It encompasses a shared narrative, a tapestry of memories, emotions, and values that bind a people to a specific territory and its institutions. However, it goes beyond an “imagined community” by grounding itself in the principles of equality and popular sovereignty. This implies that a national community is not solely defined by a shared story but also by the aspiration to be a self-governing entity built on the equality of its members.
Modernization and the Reshaping of Religious Communities
Modernization, with its emphasis on equality and sovereignty, has profoundly impacted religious communities. They have been compelled to reconsider their shared identities and commitments to secular communities as a result. Surprisingly, there are many instances of this metamorphosis that aren’t always directly related to nation-building; one such example is the King James Bible.
The Case of Muslim Nations: Reconciling Islam with the Nation
For Muslim nations, the challenge lay in aligning the Islamic tradition with the homogenization of the national collective This involved adapting the concept of ummah, transforming it from defining the diverse territories and populations of the caliphate to describing a spiritual, non-territorial community bound by shared religious beliefs.
Turkey: Islam and the Nation Intertwined
As the Ottoman Empire crumbled, the state emerged as the central political authority. It experienced a profound religious and cultural shift that, according to Cesari, set the stage for Islam to become politicized and gave rise to Islamist movements. In Turkey, the connection between Islamic and national belonging is deeply ingrained. In order to achieve this, the dominant Sunni school was incorporated into the state machinery, imams were appointed as state officials, and laiklik (laicite) was promoted as the hallmark of Turkish identity.
The AKP and a More Assertive Islam
The Justice and Development Party (AKP) has built upon this foundation, promoting a more assertive expression of Islam in public spaces. However, the AKP hasn’t displaced the fundamental conflation of Sunni Islam, laiklik, and the nation. Instead, it has added a layer of social conservatism, emphasizing dress codes and attempts to moralize public spaces. Additionally, the AKP has leveraged Islam for international policy and regional leadership in the Middle East and the Balkans.
Adapting Judaism to the National Framework: A Different Path
The adaptation of Judaism to the national framework took a different path. Although the “God’s message-people-territory” triad is still essential to Judaism as a holy community, the migration of Jews to Europe changed the custom into a contemporary religion. This meant downplaying the allegiance to Zion as a politically independent, revelation-based community. Zion continued to be important in liturgy and rituals, and becoming a part of contemporary European societies was accepted as a social goal.
The Rise of Modern Zionism
But as the Dreyfus Affair (1896–1906) revealed, antisemitism did not go away with adaptation or membership in secular groups. This gave rise to modern Zionism. Theodore Herzel’s political goal was to embrace the contemporary idea of “a nation for Jews” as an autonomous, sovereign society founded on human equality, rather than to return to the hallowed Zion. This gave rise to a continuous discussion concerning the place of Judaism in the secular nation-state; this discussion was made worse by the establishment of the state of Israel and the conflict with the Palestinian nation.
The 2018 Basic Law: Defining Israel as a Jewish Nation-State
From this perspective, the controversial 2018 Basic Law – “the Nation-State of the Jewish People” – is an attempt to resolve this ambiguity. For the first time, a constitutional provision defines the Israeli state as the nation-state of exclusively Jewish people, diminishing the legitimacy of other religions and the Arabic language. This move endangers the legal equality “theoretically” granted to all minorities.
The Fusion of Religion and National Belonging: A Source of Tension
The merging of religion and national identity is the root cause of the political conflicts in Israel regarding religion. But in Turkey, there is agreement among all sides regarding the Turk/Islam connection but disagreement regarding the alignment of political and religious behaviors, which is similar to the tensions in American politics surrounding white supremacy, abortion, and contraception.
Public Morality and the Status of Minorities: A Contested Terrain
The state’s fusion with religion turns religious practice into a contentious arena. The status of sexual minorities and public morality are hotly contested issues in both nations. It is expected that the state will control and arbitrate disputes over competing ideas about what makes a good Jewish or Muslim citizen. Essentially, national culture has shaped religion, and religious affiliation has become intrinsically linked to civic and national identity.
Beyond Instrumentalization: Religious Nationalism as a Defining Trait of Citizenship
This analysis reveals that religious nationalism cannot be solely understood as the instrumentalization of religion by the state or religious groups. It is a defining characteristic of citizenship, independent of individual religious beliefs or practices. While evaluating the role of religion in society often occurs at the individual level, it’s crucial to analyze religion and politics at the community level as well.
Cesari’s insightful analysis challenges us to move beyond simplistic interpretations of religious nationalism. By focusing on the community level, we gain a deeper understanding of how religious traditions adapt to modern national identities, shaping the political landscape and influencing the lives of individuals within these communities. The cases of Turkey and Israel, with their unique historical trajectories and contemporary challenges, offer valuable insights into the complex interplay between religion, nationalism, and the pursuit of a shared national identity.
The role of the Jewish community
Understanding how Turkish-Israeli relations have persisted and been periodically revived requires identifying their enduring structure. The solidity of their economic ties constitutes the first axis of that continuity. To prove this, all we need to do is remember that Turkey’s exports to Israel tripled during the turbulent years we just talked about, from two billion dollars in 2011 to seven billion dollars. 03 billion in 2022. Providing 5. 2% of the country’s imports, Turkey is thus Israel’s fifth-largest supplier and its seventh-largest customer for 2. 2% of its exports, to the tune of 2. 5 billion dollars per annum. These trade relations concern vital domains. Leading the list of Israel’s imports from Turkey are steel, iron, textiles, motor vehicles, and cement; not to be forgotten is Azerbaijani oil, which is transported via the Caucus and Eastern Anatolia via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (BTC) to the Ceyhan harbor, providing 20% of Israel’s annual consumption of brut. Additionally, the Turkish corporation Zorlu provides electricity for 7% of Israel. As for Israel, its exports to Turkey consist mostly of chemical products and high-tech equipment. These have been essential to Turkey’s industrial production’s modernization in recent years, especially in the manufacturing of weapons.
A shared historical memory between these two nations is another aspect of their relationship that helps them get past the whims of their reciprocal relationships. Jews made up the “Millets”2 of the Ottoman Empire, giving refuge to Sephardi Jews from Spain during the fifteenth century, especially in its well-known port cities (Salonica, Istanbul, Izmir, etc.). ). Even though they have been in an unfair situation since the Turkish Republic’s founding, as demonstrated by the numerous anti-Semitic incidents that occurred during and after World War II, they manage to maintain one of the last Jewish communities in the Muslim world based on careful observation of their linguistic and cultural specificities. Recently, the Turkish TV series Kulup demonstrated this. Due in part to this history and the present circumstances, there has been a surge in Israeli tourism to Turkey. Despite the many crises that have arisen, Israeli tourists have continued to travel there and, as of October 2023, constituted one of the country’s largest foreign visitor groups.
Finally, we cannot minimize the importance of the two countries’ shared strategic goals, even in the face of the tense environment surrounding their relationship. Because Turkey is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and is home to several important bases, including the headquarters for the allied land forces of the Alliance’s southern flank at Izmir, the anti-ballistic missile radar station at Kürecik, which is primarily aimed towards Iran, and the Incirlik airport, which serves as a relay for the transfer of military hardware to Israel when needed, Turkey is still an ally of the West. Ankara joined the anti-missile European Sky Shield Initiative in February 2024. The initiative was based on a German initiative from 2023 and was backed by 17 other nations. This project, shunned by France, will use among other equipment, the Israeli long-range Arrow 3 missiles.
Besides which, neither country is about abandoning its lasting conflict with Syria. Ankara has taken control of the area that crosses its border with Syria as a result of several military incursions in 2018. Despite its claims to have no irredentist goals, Ankara has been administering and equipping these areas ever since. Its principal objective is to prevent the establishment of the People’s Protection Units (YPG), a Kurdish militia affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Regarding Israel, within the parameters of the ongoing conflicts, its army frequently launches strikes against the positions of the Syrian regime and its regional allies, the Lebanese Hezbollah, with Russian approval when necessary.
Even though the officials of the two countries diverged greatly about their commitments in the Caucuses, there was a clear strategic convergence in 2020 during the second Nagorno-Karabakh war, where both provided crucial military support to Azerbaijan, ultimately allowing it to recapture the Armenian enclave.
In the Shadow of Gaza
Because of their close bonds and shared interests, Israel and Turkey’s relations have persevered despite the verbal spat that followed the Gaza war between Ankara and Tel Aviv.
- Translations:
- français
- عربي
- English
- فارسى
Translated from French by Noël Burch.
Just as Turkey’s reaction to the invasion of Ukraine startled observers with its legalism and insistence on upholding Kiev’s sovereignty, so too did its initial cautious stance towards the commencement of Israel’s war on Gaza. Ankara, which maintains strong and stable ties with the two aggressor nations, has freely offered to mediate in both cases, just as it has in the past. In both cases too, the ambivalence detectable in that offer is not merely due to the conjuncture. It also captures the essence of that country’s diplomacy, which has often had to pull off risky balancing acts throughout its history.
After more than a decade of strained relations that periodically threatened divorce before experiencing protracted periods of reconciliation, Turkey and Israel were in the midst of a reconciliation process when Hamas launched its surprise attack on October 7, 2023. The capacity to manage this volatility is the first source of surprise. It is due to multiple convergences, political, strategic and above all economic. What is the future of this complicated relationship in light of the new circumstances brought about by the Israel-Palestine conflict returning to the Middle East’s forefront?
There is a long history of mutual understanding and cooperation between the two countries because Turkey was the first Muslim country to recognize Israel in 1949, shortly after the Hebrew State declared its independence. Other than a few minor clashes during the cold war brought on by the Israeli-Arab truces, their mutual relations have been incredibly positive since the end of the bipolar world. Additionally, it doesn’t appear that the “entente cordiale” was questioned during the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) rise to power at the turn of the century. Even in 2008, Ankara hosted unofficial talks aimed at easing the Syrian regime’s normalization of relations with Israel, but the talks eventually broke down.
The Turko-Israeli conflict began in 2009, but it was less about the Palestinian question and more about the new circumstances brought about by Hamas’s rise to power in the Gaza Strip after the 2006 elections. When Israel launched its first round of heavy bombings on the Palestinian enclave, dubbed “Operation Cast lead,” Ankara reacted swiftly. “In a memorable panel discussion at the January 2009 Davos economic forum, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan chastised Israeli President Shimon Pérès harshly.”
Subsequently, it seemed that the recently elected Turkish government was attempting to draw closer to Hamas in order to include it as a formal participant in the negotiations. Turkish-Israeli relations were on the verge of total collapse a year later when the Mavi Marmara, the flagship of a humanitarian flotilla led by a Turkish Islamic organization, attempted to impose the Gaza blockade. Nine Turkish humanitarian workers were killed when the ship was intercepted, and it appeared that the two countries’ relationship would never mend.
But in 2013, in a completely unprecedented step to repair their relationship, Benyamin Netanyahu agreed to offer Erdoğan the apology he was demanding. The 2014 “Protective Edge” airstrikes on Gaza were criticized by Hoover, the leader of the AKP, who said that Israel had “outdone Hitler in barbarity,” endangering the project. Because of this, it took until 2016 to establish high-level diplomatic relations and exchange ambassadors after compensation was given to the families of those slain in the humanitarian flotilla. But the truce would not last long.
The Great March of Return by the Gazans in 2019 was brutally suppressed, resulting in numerous Palestinian casualties. This led to a renewed verbal spat between the Israeli Prime Minister and the Turkish President. The two countries did not exchange ambassadors again until 2022, during a visit to Turkey by Israeli President Isaac Herzog, due to another downturn in diplomatic relations. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates were among the Arab nations with whom Ankara was trying to mend fences at the time; the latter appeared to be beginning a phase of international convergence with Israel as a result of the Abraham accords.
More than its irregularities, this ongoing argument now stands out for its tenacity, which in the end preserved the relationship between the two main characters. Because the imprisonment of a humanitarian ship, the increasingly severe and frequent airstrikes against Gaza, the heated verbal sparring between leaders, or the violent suppression of Palestinian protests did not improve the already precarious ties between those two regional powers
Turkey imposes export restrictions; Israel threatens retaliation
FAQ
What is the relationship between Israel and Turkey?
What is the relationship between Turkey and Palestine?
How close is Israel and Turkey?
Who is stronger Turkey or Israel?
What do Turkey and Israel have in common?
A Different Take on Religious Nationalism Israel’s 2018 Nation State Law and Turkey’s reversion of Hagia Sophia into a mosque in 2020 have sparked discussions about the power of national identity and religious nationalism.
Are Turkey and Israel rekindling their relationship?
Turkey and Israel have agreed to rebuild their relationship despite their differences. The agreement was reached Wednesday during a visit by Israeli President Isaac Herzog who became the first leader from Israel to arrive in Turkey in 14 years.
Why is Turkey important to Israel?
Turkey is also important to Israel’s national security for, among other things, allowing closer Israeli intelligence monitoring of Iran. In addition, the Israelis hope that improved ties with Turkey will put pressure on Hamas, which has established a presence in Istanbul and run operations from Turkey over the last decade.
Why did Israel reassess relations with Turkey?
On 28 October 2023, Israel withdrew its diplomats from Turkey to reassess the relations between the two countries, according to a statement by Israel‘s foreign minister Eli Cohen. This move came in the aftermath of comments by Turkish President Erdogan, accusing Israel of war crimes in the occupied Palestinian Territories.